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Abstract
The 1996 PRWORA legislation in the USA was aimed at encouraging work among low
income families and ending their dependence on welfare. There is general consensus in the
literature that the reform increased labour supply of low educated mothers. This paper
looks at the potential indirect impacts of the reform on elderly women related to those
low educated mothers. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy on data from the Health
and Retirement Study, we ﬁnd that the reform crowded out intergenerational transfers
of time but crowded in intergenerational transfers of money while single elderly women
slightly increased their labour supply. Our results are consistent with an intergenerational
family risk sharing network where higher child care subsidies motivate the family to shift
away from grandmother provided child care to formal child care, and where elderly women
increase money transfers to either help cover the remaining cost of formal care or to partly
compensate for the loss in beneﬁts of young welfare leavers.
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1 Introduction
The 1996 Personal Responsibilities and Work Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in the USA was
a major legislative reform whose main objective was to get low income families oﬀ welfare
and into work. The reform replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and combined four diﬀerent child care pro-
grams into a single block fund, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). The three
main features of the reform were (1) stricter work requirements, (2) time limits on beneﬁts,
and (3) increased child care funding. There is general consensus in the literature1 that the
welfare reform increased the labour supply of low educated mothers in the USA.
In this paper, we take the analysis one step further by estimating the potential indirect
impacts of the 1996 reform on extended family members. More speciﬁcally, we focus on the
intergenerational transfers of time and money that elderly women make to their adult children,
and on the labour supply behavior of those elderly women. Intuitively, while elderly women
with adult children are not directly eligible to receive TANF beneﬁts, the reform might have
had an indirect impact on them via the intergenerational transfers of time and money that
they make to their potentially eligible adult daughters.
The intergenerational family forms a natural informal support network and there is ev-
idence in the literature2 that intergenerational transfers of both time and money are still
prevalent in the USA and especially among low income families. Over the past few decades,
the USA has also witnessed an increase in grandparent involvement in grandchild care in the
form of both (1) increased number of children living with their grandparents and (2) increased
number of children being taken care of by a grandparent during the day. For instance, data
from the US Census 2000 report shows that there has been nearly a doubling in the number
of children under 18 living in grandparent headed households3, from 2 million or 3.2% in 1970
to 4.5 million or 6.3% in 2000. Meanwhile, there has been a steady increase in grandparent
care use by employed mothers with children under 5 from 15.9% in 1985 to 19.6% in 2005.
On average, conditional on receiving grandparent care, preschoolers with employed mothers
were spending 24 hours per week in grandparent care while preschoolers with non employed
mothers were spending 12 hours per week in grandparent care4.
Several studies have sought to estimate the impact of welfare reforms on labour supply
1Comprehensive literature reviews are provided in Moﬃtt (2002), Blank (2002), Grogger and Karoly (2005).
2McGarry and Schoeni (1995), Soldo and Hill (1995)
3Such trends have been attributed to rising substance abuse, AIDS, unemployment, teen pregnancy, and
rising out of wedlock birthrates. The median age of US grandparent caregivers is 57. The majority, 68% of
grandparent caregivers are White while 29% are African-American.
4Source: US Census Bureau Reports Who's Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements based on data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
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of low income families. McKernan and al (2000) use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach on
Current Population Survey (CPS) data, and ﬁnd that the TANF reform increased the labour
force participation of single women with children. Using state variation in the timing of
implementation of TANF, O'Neill and Hill (2001) ﬁnd that TANF accounted for 60% of the
increase in labour force participation of single mothers between 1996 and 2000. Grogger (2003)
ﬁnd that time limits accounted for 7% increase in employment of female headed families during
the period 1993 to 1999, using CPS data. On the other hand, Schoeni and Blank (2000) analyse
the impact of the early 1990's waivers and the impact of TANF on labour supply of women.
They ﬁnd that the early waivers accounted for most of the increase in labour force participation
of women with TANF having only small additional impacts.
Studies which focused on the impact of child care subsidies on employment of mothers
include Blau and Tekin (2003) and Tekin (2005). Using data from the National Survey of
American Families (NSAF), Blau and Tekin (2003) ﬁnd that child care subsidies accounted
for 38% of the rise in labour force participation of single mothers. Instrumenting actual subsidy
receipt data from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families, Tekin (2005) ﬁnds that child
care subsidies increased employment of single mothers and also moved child care from parental
and relative care to centre based care.
Overall, the literature on welfare reforms in the 1990's USA tends to agree that the reform
did increase labour force participation of women, and especially that of single mothers. To
our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst addressing the issue of potential indirect impact of the
1996 PRWORA legislation on extended family members. Such indirect impacts might have
important implications for welfare analysis, especially if government help is actually crowding
out intergenerational transfers and aﬀecting other generations as well. We therefore seek to
answer two main questions in this study: (1) Did the reform crowd out intergenerational
transfers of time and money? and (2) Did the reform inﬂuence elderly women's labour supply
behavior? Although we also look at potential impacts across adult siblings, we focus the
analysis on grandmothers, who are the main source of observed intergenerational transfers in
our dataset.
We estimate the impact of the reform on extended family members using data from the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a longitudinal dataset starting from 1992
onwards and has as main respondents elderly people born between 1931 to 1941, making them
an ideal group for analysis since this age group tends to give a lot of intergenerational transfers.
We use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to estimate the impact of the reform on extended
family labour supply behaviour. To this purpose, we deﬁne the control group as extended
families with no young working age women eligible for TANF beneﬁts, and the treatment
group as extended families with at least one young working age woman potentially eligible for
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TANF. We construct our eligibility criteria based on whether any young working age woman
has a child under 18, has less than high school education and is either single or married with
spouse unemployed.
We ﬁrst estimate the impact of the TANF reform on the labour force participation of
the eligible young women to see whether the reform had any impact on the eligible group of
young mothers. We then proceed to estimate the indirect impact of the reform on their female
siblings to capture the potential intra-generational impacts of the reform. Finally, we estimate
the indirect impact of the reform on the work behaviour of elderly females related to eligible
young women, as well as the impact of the reform on overall intergenerational transfers of time
and money made by those elderly women to their adult children.
Results from our intergenerational analysis using HRS indicate an increase in labour force
participation of the eligible group of young working age mothers5. However, the impact
of this increase is small and insigniﬁcant for intergenerational families living together. The
reform also seems to have had important impacts on single elderly women. For this type
of family, we observe crowding out of intergenerational transfers of time and crowding in
of intergenerational transfer of money, as well as a slight increase in the labour supply of
elderly women. This result suggests that while stronger work requirements and time limits
on beneﬁts could have motivated young mothers to increase labour supply and thereby be
in greater need of child care, it is possible that the impact of child care subsidies could be
important in motivating low income families to substitute from informal grandmother care to
formal day care, thereby enabling the grandmother to work longer hours on the market and
give more ﬁnancial help to their adult daughters. Moreover, for those young mothers who
were motivated to leave the TANF program as a result of stricter work requirements and time
limits on beneﬁts, it is possible that the loss in welfare beneﬁts contributed to the crowding
in of private intertergenerational transfers of money from the elderly women. We found no
impact for married elderly women.
Section 2 provides background information on the reform. In Section 3, we present eco-
nomic intuition on the diﬀerent channels via which the reform might aﬀect elderly women. We
then present our empirical strategy in Section 4 and results from the HRS in Section 5. We
conclude in section 6.
5We do not observe labour hours for the young women in the HRS and therefore limit our analysis to labour
force participation
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2 Background
In this section, we give a brief description of the reform6 and present some trends corroborating
what is already known in the literature on welfare-to-work reforms.
2.1 Welfare Reform
The 1996 Personal Responsibilities and Work Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was a major
legislative reform that replaced the Aids to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with
the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and combined four diﬀerent child care
programs into a single block fund, the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF). The reform
was implemented over the period between September 1996 to May 1997 and was aimed at
getting low income families oﬀ welfare and into work. Under TANF, states receive a block
grant allowing them much ﬂexibility in running welfare programs deﬁned within broad federal
guidelines. Three main components of the reform were: (1) stricter work requirements, (2)
time limits on beneﬁts and (3) increased child care funding.
Eligibility for TANF Beneﬁts An eligible family is one where there is a child under 18
and where the family's current income and assets fall below certain standards7. Many states
maintained the income eligibility tests that existed under AFDC i.e. (1) that family income
before earnings disregards had to be lower than 185% of state's needs standard and (2) that
family income after earnings disregards had to be lower than state's payment standard. Under
AFDC, countable assets had to be less than $1,000 (where the deﬁnition of countable assets
excludes the value of certain assets such as a vehicle worth up to $1,500). Under TANF,
many states raised asset limits and increased the vehicle exemption. Two parent families are
eligible for beneﬁts based on the family's ﬁnancial circumstances and include families where
one parent is unemployed or incapacitated.
Work Requirements The Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program introduced
by the Family Support Act of 1988 required non exempt families on welfare to engage in work
related activities. In 1994, families were required to participate in work related activities of
at least 20 hours a week. Families with children under 3 (or 1 at state option) could be
6Detailed information of the reforms is available in the US Green Book. The State Policy Documentation
Project (SPDP) provides useful summarised information on the various reform components while the Admin-
istration for Children and Families (ACF) [US Department of Health & Human Services] provides information
on the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF).
7Detailed information are available in the Annual Reports to Congress available from the Department of
Health and Human Services. A summary of state plans as from October 1997 is available in Gallagher & al
(1999).
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exempted from the work requirement while non exempt families not complying with the work
requirements could face sanctions involving reductions in their beneﬁts.
Under TANF, work requirements were even stricter: single parent families were required to
engaged in work related activities for at least 20 hours a week in 1997, increasing to 30 hours
a week by 2000 while two parent families were required engaged in work related activities for
at least 35 hours a week in 1997. States are allowed to exempt single parents with children
under age 1 from the work requirement (or with children less than 6 years provided the parent
can demonstrate unavailability of appropriate child care within reasonable distance of home or
work). Under federal guidelines, non exempt families on welfare had 24 months to comply with
the work requirements or face sanctions ranging from losing a percentage of TANF beneﬁts
until compliance to losing the beneﬁts permanently8.
Time Limits Time limits are arguably the most signiﬁcant change introduced by the 1996
PRWORA. While under AFDC, recipients faced no time limits on beneﬁts, under TANF,
recipients face a maximum federal lifetime limit of 60 months on beneﬁts. States are allowed
to impose more stringent limits to beneﬁciaries of TANF beneﬁts coming from the federal
grant and many states did so. States are also allowed to exempt 20% of caseloads from the
limit or use state funds should they wish to extend the beneﬁts.
Child Care Development Fund The 1996 PRWORA also combined four diﬀerent child
care programs9 into a single block grant fund, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF),
whose main goal is to facilitate transition from welfare to work. Under PRWORA, states were
required to maintain at least 100% of their 1994 or 1995 child care expenditures whichever is
highest. Moreover, states are allowed to transfer up to 30% of their federal TANF allocation
to the CCDF. From 1996 to 2002, federal funding totaling more than $69 billion supported
the child care needs of low income working families with a rise of 89% in child care subsidies
between 1993 and 2000.
Families whose income does not exceed 85% of state median income and with children under
13 are eligible for child care subsidies under CCDF. In addition, parents must be involved in
a work related activity. Parents are free to choose any legally operating child care provider
which includes centre based, in home and family care. In 1998, 22 states limited the use
8Many states also imposed stricter sanctions for non compliance with the work requirements due to federal
stricter caseloads requirements. For instance, in 1994, states were required to get 15% of caseloads in work
related activities compared to 25% [75%] in 1997 increasing to 50% [90%] by 2000 for single [two] parent
families.
9The four previous programs were the AFDC Child Care, At Risk Child Care, Transitional Child Care and
Child Care Development Block Grant
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of in home care10 and 14 states required all family home providers paid through the CCDF
to be subject to licensing11. For those family home providers not licensed, states have prior
standards imposed such as health and safety self certiﬁcation, maintenance of immunisation
records, no criminal records, health tests, annual inspections, health and safety training etc.
2.2 Trends
2.2.1 Comparison Groups
The main aim of the 1996 PRWORA legislation was to get low income families oﬀ welfare and
into work. Eligibility for TANF beneﬁts is based on whether a family has a child under 18,
and income and assets below certain limits as described above. We use education as a proxy
for determining low income families and construct our eligibility criteria based on whether we
have a working age woman with children under 18, who has less than high school education,
and is single or married with spouse unemployed12.
2.2.2 Trends in Young Women's Labour Supply Behaviour
The increase in labour force participation of women over the past couple of decades is well
known13. In this section, we look at trends in the work behaviour of working age young women.
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) years 1980 to 2004. The PSID
is a longitudinal dataset of individuals starting in 1968 and conducted yearly until 1997 when
it was conducted biennially onwards. Each interview contains detailed information on heads
and spouses, such as demographics, labour supply, income etc14. We limit the sample to young
women aged between 18 to 49 and split them into a treatment group and a control group.
Figures 1 and 2 show trends in labour supply behaviour of young working age women with
Figure 1 showing average labour force participation and Figure 2 showing average weekly hours
10Limits imposed usually involves imposing a minimum number of children to be served or health and safety
standards. Those limits arise out of ﬁnancial reasons or of concern for quality and health standards.
11In 2004, 35 states limited the use of in home care and 16 states required all family home providers paid
through the CCDF to be subject to licensing. Source: CCDF Report of State Plans [US Department of Health
and Human Services].
12Education and marital status could also be arguably endogenous. We include family ﬁxed eﬀects in our
models thereby allowing for education and marital status to be correlated with the ﬁxed eﬀects. Under the
assumption that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with our transitory error term, the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimation should therefore identify the average treatment eﬀect on treated.
13Labour force participation of women with children under 18 increased from 47% to 71% in between 1975
and 2006. Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics
14For the years in between the biennial interviews, we took the average of the variables between the preceding
year and the following year. Questions concerning labour supply include current labour force participation and
previous year's weekly hours of work. We consider a women as working in the previous year if she reported
positive weekly hours of work.
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Figure 1: Young Women's Labour Force Participation PSID
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 M
G
 W
o
rk
in
g
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Treatment Control
Working Age Young Women - Labour Force Participation
of work. The solid dark lines represent labour supply of the treatment group and the pale
dotted lines represent labour supply of the control group. The vertical lines indicate the period
during which the 1996 PRWORA legislation was implemented. As can be seen in Figure 1
both the proportion of young working age women working and the average weekly hours of
work for treatment group are considerably lower than those of the control group. However,
there is a visible increase in labour supply at both the extensive and the intensive margin
after the 1996 PRWORA legislation suggesting that the reform might have contributed to the
increase in labour supply of young working age women.
In Appendix B, we assess whether the PRWORA reform had any impact on the labour
supply behaviour of low income young mothers, the main target of the reform using the PSID.
The length of the dataset allows us to perform trends tests prior to the reform among our
control and treatment groups. Moreover, the observation of detailed geographic information
allows us to diﬀerentiate to some extent between the impact of pre PRWORA waivers and
the actual 1996 legislation. Our results from the PSID indicate that the TANF reform has
increased both work participation and labour hours of low educated young mothers. Moreover,
we ﬁnd that the 1996 PRWORA had stronger signiﬁcant eﬀects compared to the early 1990's
waivers. More in detail in Appendix B15.
15The PSID also follows split-oﬀ family members so that several nuclear families from diﬀerent household
units can be linked together to form an intergenerational family. Unfortunately, the intergenerational family
samples are quite small in the PSID. The PSID also has very limited information on intergenerational transfers
of time and money. Intergenerational transfer of money observed from family members in the PSID is from
all relatives and not just from the grandparent household. Intergenerational transfers of time in the form of
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Figure 2: Young Women's Labour Supply PSID
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3 Intergenerational Family Labour Supply and Transfers Be-
haviour
In this section, we analyse how the reform could have aﬀected intergenerational transfers
of time and money and labour supply behaviour within an intergenerational family. The
presence of an informal support network in the form of the intergenerational family could
potentially lead to unexpected impacts of the reform such as crowding out of private transfers
and adjustments in the labour supply of intergenerational family members. We focus the
analysis mainly on elderly women (the grandmothers) since they are the ones who are most
likely to be involved in grandchild care and therefore the ones most likely to adjust behaviour
as a result of welfare to work reforms aﬀecting their adult daughters.
3.1 How would Eligible Young Mothers be Aﬀected?
There is general consensus in the literature that stricter work requirements, time limits on
beneﬁts and increased child care subsidies, would encourage low skilled young mothers to
increase their labour supply and leave welfare. To sum up, Figure 3 illustrates a simpliﬁed
example of introducing stricter work requirements and child care subsidies on the budget
grandchild care can only be observed from 1997 onwards using the Child Development Survey (CDS) where
the grandmother can be traced back to the PSID if she is the main caregiver of the child. Moreover, we have
limited information on intergenerational family members living together so that we choose to focus the main
intergenerational analysis on HRS data.
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constraint of the young mothers in a simple consumption-leisure framework. More in details
in Appendix B.
Suppose that a young mother has to employ child care hF for each hour of work that
she does. Also, suppose that if she employs child care, she has to employ it for a minimum
amount16 of time hF such that ﬁxed cost of work in terms of child care is −wFhF . The before
reform budget constraint was given by abcdefg with ﬁxed cost of work −wFhF and with
some work requirements HL as was the case under the AFDC. There is a discontinuity in the
budget constraint between ab due to the ﬁxed cost of work. Child care cost also decrease the
per hour wage w by the per hour formal care cost wF . Moreover, once the work requirement
is satisﬁed, the young mother can claim welfare beneﬁts and be on segment ef where the
beneﬁts are phased out at beneﬁt reduction rate17 τ .
Figure 3: Welfare Reform and Young Mothers' Budget Constraint
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Now suppose that the government introduces stricter work requirements HH and child care
16This could be due to minimum hours imposed by child care centres or by babysitters to cover their own
ﬁxed costs of providing care.
17Most states did not change beneﬁt levels after the reform [Blank (2002), Gallagher & al (1998)]. On
the other hand, many states implemented lower beneﬁt reduction rates (BRR). A reduction in the BRR is
similar to an increase in wages with opposite income and substitution eﬀects. While the income eﬀect would
encourage workers to work less (and consume more leisure under the assumption that the latter is a normal
good), the substitution eﬀect would encourage workers to work more. Empirically, the substitution eﬀect tends
to dominate for low skilled workers. We therefore expect the reduction in BRR to reinforce the impact of
stricter work requirements and increase work incentives for low skilled workers.
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subsidies of s per hour of child care employed. The new budget constraint is given by ahijklm
with reduced ﬁxed cost of work − (1− s)wFhF and with some stricter work requirements HH
as was the case under the PRWORA legislation. The discontinuity in the budget constraint
between ah is now much smaller due to the reduced ﬁxed cost of work thanks to the child
care subsidies. We can immediately see that individuals who were previously at a and not
working, would now have higher incentives to enter the labour force. On the other hand those
low skilled young mothers who were previously on welfare on segment ef but working less
than HH hours of work would now either (1) stay on the new TANF program and increase
labour supply to meet the stricter work requirements, or (2) leave the TANF program.
The introduction of time limits on beneﬁts would also provide further incentives to leave
welfare, ﬁrstly from a mechanical eﬀect since recipients become automatically ineligible on
expiry of the time limit, and secondly from a behavioural eﬀect since some recipients may
choose to leave welfare so as to preserve future eligibility. While the mainstream literature
concludes that those who leave welfare would automatically increase labour supply so as to
become ﬁnancially independent, this might not be the case in the presence of an informal
support network such as the intergenerational family. For instance, elderly women could be
increasing private ﬁnancial transfers to their adult daughters so as to compensate for the loss
in welfare beneﬁts. In this case, the impact on labour supply of the young mothers who leave
welfare would be ambiguous.
3.2 How would Elderly Women related to Eligible Young Mothers be Af-
fected?
Figure 4 illustrates the main channels through which we expect the reform to have aﬀected
intergenerational family behaviour. Starting from the impact of the 1996 PRWORA legislation
on young mothers, we expect low skilled mothers to either stay on TANF beneﬁts or leave the
TANF program.
As argued above, those who choose to remain on TANF beneﬁts would have to increase
labour supply so as to meet the stricter work requirements thereby leading to increased child
care needs. While one might expect this to lead to an increase in demand for grandmother
provided child care, the increased child care subsidies might lead to a shift from grandmother
to formal child care. As outlined in the Background Section 2, many states limited the use of
in-home care and subjected family care providers to licensing and health and safety standards.
Moreover, young mothers' higher earnings could lead to an income eﬀect leading to greater
demands for higher quality care provided by formal child care means. Tekin (2005) ﬁnds
that child care subsidies moved child care from relative care to centre based care. Thus, if
grandmother provided child care decreases as a result, the grandmother would face a time
11
constraint eﬀect, allowing her to either increase her leisure hours or her work hours on the
formal labour market. The impact on ﬁnancial transfers would be ambiguous. If the elderly
women increase work and earn more, they may choose to increase ﬁnancial transfers to their
adult daughters to contribute towards the cost of formal care. However, the latter are also
earning more than before and may therefore not need the increased ﬁnancial transfers.
Figure 4: Welfare Reform and the Intergenerational Family
Low Skilled Young Mothers
1996 PRWORA Reform
Work Requirements (WR) + Time Limits (TL) + Child Care Subsidies (CCDF)
Leave TANF BenefitsStay on TANF Benefits
n Labour supply  n Earnings
n Child care needs
nCCDF  switch from relative to 
formal care
No Change in Labour supply 
No Change in Child care needs
p Income due to withdrawal of 
welfare benefits 
Elderly Women
p Grandmother Care
np Grandmother labour supply
np Net Financial Transfers
np Grandmother care
n Grandmother labour supply 
n Net Financial Transfers
Now, consider a young mother who leaves the TANF program. Leaving welfare generates
a negative income eﬀect since she loses welfare beneﬁts18. As a result, it is more likely that
those young mothers who leave welfare would be receiving higher ﬁnancial transfers from the
elderly grandmothers. In this case, the young mother can either increase her labour supply
or not change labour supply by much. If she increases her labour supply, we once again
expect her to have higher child care needs. In this case, we get a similar eﬀect as outlined
for those who increased labour supply to stay on the TANF program with the increased child
care subsidies helping her transition from welfare to work. On the other hand, if the young
mothers who leave welfare do not change their labour supply by much, we would not expect
much change in child care needs. The withdrawal of beneﬁts would however, cause an income
18Evidence on total income (earnings plus unearned income) is mixed. Grogger (2003) ﬁnds that time limits
had no signiﬁcant eﬀects on income. Schoeni and Blank (2000) ﬁnd that TANF reform had some signiﬁcant
impact on income: women among the middle and upper income distribution of less skilled women experienced
a 3 to 6% rise in income, but women among the lower income distribution of less skilled women experienced
no signiﬁcant impact on income.
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eﬀect on the intergenerational family, which might encourage the elderly women to work more
and increase ﬁnancial transfers that they make to their adult daughters. In this case, the
impact on grandmother provided child care is ambiguous since the grandmother may choose
to decrease grandmother provided care or decrease leisure so as to work more on the formal
labour market.
Thus, welfare to work reforms targeting low skilled young mothers could have unintended
impacts on economic behaviour when those low skilled young mothers form part of an in-
tergenerational family network. The intergenerational family might adjust time and money
transfers as well as labour supply to compensate for the reform impacts on the young mothers.
On one hand, the reform could have encouraged young mothers to increase labour supply and
substitute from grandmother provided care to formal child care thereby crowding out intergen-
erational transfers of time with ambiguous impacts on intergenerational transfers of money.
On the other hand, the reform could also have encouraged young mothers to leave welfare
thereby creating higher needs for private ﬁnancial transfers. A formal model of intergener-
ational family behaviour is presented in Appendix C. The net impacts on intergenerational
family behaviour remains an empirical question which we now turn to.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Comparison Groups
Eligibility for TANF beneﬁts is based on whether a family has a child under 18, and income
and assets below certain limits as described in our Background Section 2. We use education
as a proxy for determining low income families and construct our eligibility criteria based on
whether we have a working age woman with children under 18, who has less than high school
education, and is single or married with spouse unemployed19.
We separate our intergenerational families into a treatment group and a control group as
illustrated in Figure 5. Our treatment group includes those intergenerational families which
have at least one adult working age young woman eligible for TANF beneﬁts while our con-
trol group includes those intergenerational families which do not have any adult working age
daughters eligible for TANF beneﬁts.
19In the HRS, we cannot construct actual eligibility since we do not observe detailed state information but
only census division of residence. Moreover, we only observe bandwidth income information for the adult
children. Even if such information were available, earned income being jointly determined with labour supply
would make our eligibility variable endogenous. We therefore choose education as a proxy for low income
families. Education and marital status could also be arguably endogenous. We include family ﬁxed eﬀects in
our models thereby allowing for education and marital status to be correlated with the ﬁxed eﬀects. Under
the assumption that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with our transitory error term, the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimation should therefore identify the average treatment eﬀect on treated.
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Figure 5: Treatment and Control Families
Elderly Woman
Working Age Eligible
Adult Daughter
Elderly Woman
Working Age Non Eligible
Adult Daughter
Eligibility of Working Age Adult Daughter based on:
(1) Has Children under 18
(2) Less than High School Education
(3) Single or Married with Spouse Unemployed
Treatment Control
When analysing the impact of welfare reform on eligible young women's labour force par-
ticipation, we therefore use as treatment the young women eligible for TANF beneﬁts and as
control, the young women belonging to control families. Similarly, when analysing the impact
of welfare reform on non eligible young women related to the eligible females (adult working
age siblings), we use as treatment those young women not directly eligible but in treatment
families, and as control those young women not eligible and in control families. The same
logic applies to the classiﬁcation of elderly women into treatment or control group according
to whether they are in treatment or control families. Some illustrative ﬁgures are presented
in the appendix.
4.2 Data
We use data from the HRS corresponding to years 1991 to 2001. The HRS is a biennial survey
starting from 1992 onwards, asking retrospective questions of respondents born between 1931
and 1941, and their spouses. It is a comprehensive dataset containing speciﬁc information
about labour supply of the respondents and their adult children, grandchild care hours, inter-
generational transfers of money, as well as a pool of demographic and income variables. We
limit our sample to elderly women aged between 50 and 70, and who have at least one adult
daughter. We also drop all observations in which the elderly women have children below 18 in
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their household, so that the elderly women are not directly eligible to apply for TANF beneﬁts
themselves.
4.2.1 Young Women Sample
To analyse the impact of the PRWORA reform on low educated young mother's labour force
participation, we reshape the data into a young women sample, i.e. with one observation per
young woman20.
Outcome Variables
Eligible Young Women Labour Force Participation In the HRS, we only observe a
categorical variable on labour supply of adult children: whether they are not working, working
for less than 30 hours or for more than 30 hours per week. We construct a dummy variable
taking value 1 if the young woman is working and 0 otherwise. To analyse the impact of
the reform on eligible young women, we use eligible young women in treatment families as
treatment group and non eligible young women in control families as control group.
Non Eligible Adult Sisters' Labour Force Participation Similarly, to analyse the
impact of the reform on non eligible adult sisters of eligible young women, we use non eligible
adult sisters in treatment families as treatment group and non eligible young women in control
families as control group. Diagrammatic examples are provided in Appendix Section A.1
Summary Statistics Summary statistics for young women are reported in the Table 1
Young Women Sample. We report means and standard deviations (in brackets) for treatment
group (T) and control group (C) separately. As can be seen from the Table 1, young women
of treatment families tend to be less educated and have more children than those in control
families although there does not seem to be much diﬀerence in age.
4.2.2 Grandmother Sample
To analyse the impact of the PRWORA reform on elderly women's outcomes, we use the
elderly women (grandmother) sample21.
20For example, if an elderly woman has two adult daughters, then reshaping the data into a young women
sample would yield two observations for this intergenerational family.
21We also redid all of our regressions based on the young women sample. All results were qualitatively similar
and as signiﬁcant as those obtained from the grandmother sample. We chose to focus on grandmother's results
from the grandmother sample since we are focusing on elderly women's outcomes and using the young women
sample might lead to double counting of the grandmothers in both treatment and control groups.
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Outcome Variables
Elderly Women Labour Supply Behaviour We look at three diﬀerent outcomes
when analysing elderly women's labour supply behaviour: (a) self reported retirement status
and (b) whether the elderly women is currently working for pay and (c) weekly hours of work.
(a) In the HRS, elderly women are asked whether they are currently fully retired, partly retired
or not retired. We construct a dummy variable taking value 1 if she reports fully or partly
retired and 0 otherwise. (b) We also construct a dummy variable taking value 1 if the elderly
woman is currently working for pay and 0 otherwise. (c) Weekly hours of work are based on
reports on the usual hours of work that the respondent works.
Intergenerational Transfers of Time and Money The HRS designates a family
respondent, usually the elderly woman, to answer family related questions and these include
grandchild care questions as well as ﬁnancial transfers to and from adult children. The HRS
contains a stepwise question on grandchild care, ﬁrstly asking whether the respondent provided
more than 100 hours of grandchild care since the last interview and if the answer is yes,
how many hours. Similarly, for ﬁnancial transfers, the respondent is asked whether there
were ﬁnancial transfers of more than $500 since the last interview and if the answer is yes,
the amount transferred. We deﬁne intergenerational transfers of time as weekly hours of
grandchild care and intergenerational transfers of money as weekly net ﬁnancial transfers i.e
ﬁnancial transfers from the grandparent household to their adult children minus ﬁnancial
transfers from the adult children to the grandparent household. The deﬁnition of ﬁnancial
transfers used exclude deeds to a house. They may however, include help with education,
gifts or loans. More information on intergenerational transfers data available in the HRS is
presented in our Appendix Section A.2.
Summary Statistics Summary statistics for single and married elderly women are reported
in the Table 1 Elderly Women Sample. We report means and standard deviations (in brackets)
for treatment group (T) and control group (C) separately. As can be seen from Table 1, elderly
women in treatment families tend to be poorer, less educated, more likely to be black, have
more children and are in poorer health than those in control families.
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4.3 Econometric Speciﬁcation
We use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to estimate the impact of TANF on each outcome.
We consider latent variable models of the following form:
Y ∗ist = α+ δReform · (Treatgroupi ·Reformt)
+β′Xist + θ′Est + EITCit + µg + µs + µt + µi + ist (1)
where
Treatgroupi is a group dummy variable taking value one if family i is a treatment family
Reformt is a dummy variable taking value one for years after 1997 when all states had
implemented TANF
Xist is a vector of demographic controls for all generations. For elderly women, these
include second order polynomials in age, education, years of work experience, number of
children, unearned income and wealth and dummy variables for ethnicity, health and home
ownership. For the the young adult generation, these includes second order polynomials age,
education and number of children and a dummy variable indicating home ownership, interacted
with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female or non eligible male
Est is a vector of economic controls. These include average unemployment rate and average
wage of child care workers in census region of residence22
EITCit is the maximum receivable EITC beneﬁts in year t and varies with family size of
the young women
µg = Treatgroupi is a group ﬁxed eﬀect
µs is a vector of census division dummies
µt is a vector of year dummies
µi is an family ﬁxed eﬀect
4.4 Estimation
Since our models are non linear, incorporating individual ﬁxed eﬀects is not as straightforward
as in a linear model. While introducing a set of ﬁxed eﬀect dummies in a linear regression
model would yield unbiased estimates, introducing a set of ﬁxed eﬀect dummies in a non linear
regression model would lead to the incidental parameters problem thereby yielding biased and
22We unfortunately do not observe census division of residence of the young adults. However, since it is
likely that elderly women who provide grandchild care would do so for young families not living too far oﬀ,
wage of child care workers in the census division of residence of the elderly women might be an appropriate
approximation of average cost of formal care faced by the young adults. We construct the economic variables
using data from the Bureau of Labour Statistics.
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inconsistent estimates. Moreover, since our labour force participation outcome variable is a
dummy, we would have to drop individuals who did not change their labour force participation
status from our sample [Heckman & MaCurdy (1980)]. We therefore use a Mundlak (1978)
type assumption and assume that the ﬁxed eﬀects can be modeled as a linear function of the
means of the exogenous explanatory variables23.
µi = ψ′X¯i + ai , ai ∼ N
(
0, σ2a
)
where X¯i = 1Ti
∑
tiXit is the average of the demographic variables for family i and ai is
assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and follows a normal distribution.
We can therefore rewrite the latent variable models as
Y ∗ist = α+ δReform · (Treatgroupi ·Reformt)
+β′Xist + θ′Est + EITCit + µg + µs + µt + ψ′X¯i + ai + ist
= γ′Z+ ai + ist (2)
Under the assumption that the transitory error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory vari-
ables and is identically independently normally distributed, ist ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
, we can therefore
estimate the labour force participation equations using random eﬀects probit and the hours
of work and hours of care equations using random eﬀects tobit.
The log likelihood function takes the following form:
L =
∑
i
log
{∫
Πt [f (yist|Z, a)] · h (a|Z) · da
}
where h (a|Z) is the conditional distribution of a, in our case N (0, σ2a). The likelihood function
is evaluated using Gauss Hermite Quadrature.
4.5 Issues
Several points are worth mentioning here. Firstly, the 1990's USA was a period where several
other welfare reforms occurred and these could have potentially aﬀected family behaviour.
Several states implemented TANF like waivers to their AFDC program in the early 1990's.
23Note that in this case, we would not be able to identify the coeﬃcients of the non time varying variables
separately from the ﬁxed eﬀects. However, this is not a problem since we are mainly interested in recovering the
average treatment eﬀect on treated. We also used ordinary least squares with ﬁxed eﬀects in our preliminary
regressions. All coeﬃcients were qualitatively similar and as signiﬁcant in both the linear and the non linear
speciﬁcations with slightly stronger eﬀects on labour supply of single elderly women in the linear speciﬁcation.
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Using PSID data, we exploit the diﬀerent state implementation dates for the waivers and for
the 1996 PRWORA legislation to assess the importance of those waivers on young mothers'
labour supply behaviour. Nevertheless, we recognise that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis
could still be capturing the impact of the 1996 legislation mixed with potential lagged impacts
of those early waivers. Since we are mainly interested in analysing the impact of welfare reform
directly aﬀecting the young women on the labour supply behaviour of elderly women and due
to the unavailability of public detailed state information in the HRS24, we do not attempt to
distinguish between the potential lagged impact of the early waivers from the TANF impact
when we do our intergenerational analysis.
Another concern is the 1993 Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansion which increased
generosity levels and increased the number of recipients. We construct the maximum potential
beneﬁt levels a family can receive and which varies with demographic factors, and include this
variable in our regressions to control for the potential eﬀects of the EITC expansion.
The 1996 Contract with America Advancement Act legislation, could have potentially
directly aﬀected the retirement behaviour of elderly women by raising the annual earnings
test exempt amount for recipients who have attained the full retirement age of 65. We oﬀer
theoretical arguments in Appendix Section A.3 about why we do not expect such a reform
to have aﬀected the elderly women's retirement decision. Moreover, to our knowledge, the
retirement literature has so far paid limited attention to this minor earnings test reform and
those who analysed earnings tests reforms in general found that earnings tests tend to be
unimportant in determining retirement decisions [Gruber and Orszag (2003)].
Secondly, there is a general consensus that the 1996 legislation was passed during a period
of economic boom in the USA with lower unemployment rate and an increase in wage of low
skilled labour. Moreover in 1997, the federal minimum wage was raised from $3.35 in 1989 to
$5.15 in 1997. To control for those changes in economic conditions, we include a full set of
time and census division dummies, as well as local average unemployment rate and average
wage of child care workers in the census region of residence.
Finally, we attempt to test the two main assumptions of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
strategy: (a) same trends assumption and (b) no change in group composition. Given the
length of our HRS dataset, we did not perform trends test on the HRS but using PSID data,
we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between education groups' labour supply trends prior
to 1997. Changes in group composition is usually not a concern in panel data. However,
classifying family types into grandmothers with coresident grandchildren and non coresident
24Public releases of the HRS include geographic information in the form of 9 census divisions of residence.
Information on the 50 states are available but classiﬁed as restricted data. We are currently exploring the
possibility of accessing the restricted data.
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grandchildren as we did in one of our analysis, might lead to our estimates being contaminated
by eﬀects resulting from changes in fertility25 or living arrangements26. The literature has
so far found small insigniﬁcant or ambiguous impacts on fertility and living arrangements
[Grogger and Karoly (2005)]. We also performed diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regressions using the
number of grandchildren and living arrangements as dependent variables and did not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the reform.
5 Results
We report results for four diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In speciﬁcation (1) we report a basic
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate with just time and census division dummies as controls. In
speciﬁcation (2) we include demographic controls for own generation and in speciﬁcation (3)
we include demographic controls for all generations to capture potential interactions between
all intergenerational family members. Finally, in speciﬁcation (4) we also include economic
controls and maximum EITC beneﬁts.
5.1 Baseline Results
Young Women Labour Force Participation Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients
and marginal eﬀects of the impact of the PRWORA reform on young women. In the basic
speciﬁcation (1), the reform seems to have had a positive impact on the proportion of eligible
adult daughters working with estimated marginal eﬀects27 of 6.3%. This seems in line with
the expected impacts of welfare to work reforms on young women. Including adult daughters
demographic variables in the regressions, speciﬁcation (2), leads to smaller estimated impacts
but still positive and strongly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Controlling for the demographic
variables of all generations, speciﬁcation (3), also leads to smaller impacts. Finally control-
ling for economic variables and does not make much diﬀerence suggesting that it is possible
that the census division and time dummies are already controlling for much of the economic
variation across census divisions and time. This leads to an estimated marginal eﬀect of 4.4%.
We also report the estimated potential impacts of the reform on adult sisters of potentially
eligible young mothers. The reform seems to have had a smaller impact on their labour force
participation but still positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all speciﬁcations.
25Many states imposed family caps where additional children born while the mother is on welfare, might
result in no increase welfare beneﬁts as compared to AFDC which gave higher beneﬁts to larger families.
26Bliter, Gelbach and Hoynes (2005) ﬁnd that the reform brought about an increase in the number of
grandchildren residing with grandparents especially among those of Black ethnicity.
27Marginal eﬀects are based on the derivatives of Pr (y = 1|Z) = Φ
(
γ′Z√
1+σ2a
)
= Φ (γa
′Z)
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Elderly Women Labour Supply Behaviour Table 3 reports results for elderly women's
labour supply behaviour. Tables 3S and 3M report the results obtained from the samples of
single grandmothers and married grandmothers respectively. The reform does not seem to
have had any signiﬁcant impacts on retirement status of elderly women in all speciﬁcations.
On the other hand, the estimated marginal impact of the reform on single elderly women's
work status seems large at 10% in speciﬁcation (4) but is not signiﬁcant. Similarly the reform
does not seems to have had any impact on work hours of the elderly women. It therefore seems
that the reform did not have much impact on elderly women's labour supply behaviour.
Intergenerational Transfers of Time and Money Table 4 reports results for grandchild
care hours and net ﬁnancial transfers. The reform seems to have had a small negative impact
on hours of grandchild care, suggesting some crowding out. The estimated impacts are robust
in all speciﬁcations with an estimated coeﬃcient of -2.7 weekly hours in speciﬁcation (4).
Estimated marginal eﬀect28 conditional on providing care is -0.77 weekly hours. This tends to
suggest some substitution away from grandmother provided care and seems to be in line with
the prediction that higher child care subsidies could lead to substitution away from relative
to formal care.
The crowding out of time transfers is even bigger on the sample of single grandmothers as
can be seen from Table 4S with an estimated coeﬃcient of -6.2 weekly hours in speciﬁcation (4)
and estimated marginal eﬀect of -1.55 weekly hours. Also, net ﬁnancial transfers seems to have
increased for single elderly women. Thus, it seems that while the reform encouraged young
mothers to work more, it also crowded out intergenerational transfers of time and crowded in
intergenerational transfers of money29.
On the other hand, married elderly women did not seem to have experienced any impact
from the reform apart from some slight crowding out of ﬁnancial transfers although this eﬀect
is not statistically signiﬁcant. This could be due to the fact that married elderly women are
less involved in the lives of their grandchildren and more involved with taking care of their
elderly husbands30.
28Marginal eﬀects conditional on providing care computed from random eﬀects tobit regressions based on
the derivatives of E [y|Z, y > 0] = γ′Z+ √σ2a + σ2
φ
(
γ′Z√
σ2a+σ
2

)
Φ
(
γ′Z√
σ2a+σ
2

)
29We observe which ones of the adult children received child care from the grandmother from wave 1996
onwards. Using the young women sample of 1996-2002 corresponding to years 1995 to 2001, we performed
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis on the probability that the young eligible women received care and found a
negative and signiﬁcant impact of the reform which is in line with the fact that the decrease in time transfers
from elderly women came from a decrease in time transfers to the eligible adult daughters. We did the same
for ﬁnancial transfers and found qualitatively similar eﬀects.
30We included controls for grandfather's age, health, education and years of work experience in our regressions
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Overall, the reform seems to have had important impacts on single elderly women. For
this type of family, it seems that even though stricter work requirements and time limits on
beneﬁts were encouraging young mothers to leave the TANF program and work more, the
higher child care subsidies were leading to a substitution from grandmother care to formal
care means. Meanwhile, elderly women were increasing time transfers either to help cover the
remaining cost of formal care or to partly compensate for the loss in welfare beneﬁts of TANF
leavers.
5.2 Living Arrangements
To allow for potentially diﬀerent treatment eﬀects of diﬀerent types of intergenerational fami-
lies, we separate our sample of intergenerational families into four categories: (i) single elderly
women with adult daughter and grandchildren resident (ii) married elderly women with adult
daughter and grandchildren resident (iii) single elderly women with adult daughter and grand-
children non resident, and (iv) married elderly women with adult daughter and grandchildren
non resident . It is very likely that intergenerational families living in the same household unit
interact more frequently, such that intergenerational transfers and sharing of public goods
would be more prevalent than in intergenerational families who live separately. The decision
making process might also be potentially diﬀerent for the two categories of intergenerational
families.
Summary statistics for the four categories of intergenerational families are reported in
Table 5. We report means and standard deviations (in brackets) for treatment group (T) and
control group (C) separately. As can be seen from the Table 5, elderly women in treatment
families tend to be poorer, less educated, more likely to be black, have fewer years of work
experience, more children and are in poorer health than those in control families. This is the
case for all four categories of intergenerational families.
5.2.1 Intergenerational Families Living Together
In this section, we report results for intergenerational families living together. Tables 6S and
6M reports the estimated treatment eﬀects of the 1996 reform on young women's labour force
participation for the samples where the grandmother is single and married respectively. The
impact of the reform on labour force participation of eligible young mothers is small and
insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations suggesting that the reform did not have much impact on
based on the married sample. An unhealthy grandfather might consume a lot of the grandmother's time and
make her less involved with her adult children's lives. Also, even if the grandfather is healthy, there might
be some complementarity in leisure behaviour thereby leading to a coordination of work and grandchild care
behaviour among elderly couples.
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inﬂuencing labour force participation of young women when they live together with an elderly
woman.
Tables 7S and 7M report the eﬀects of the reform on elderly women's labour supply for
the samples of single and married grandmothers respectively. Overall, the reform seems to
have had no signiﬁcant impacts on retirement or work status of elderly women. On the other
hand, while single grandmothers seem to have increased their work hours, once we control for
demographic variables, the estimated impacts become insigniﬁcant.
Tables 8S and 8M report the eﬀects of the reform on elderly women's time and money
transfers for the sample of single and married grandmothers respectively. The reform seems to
have had large crowding out impacts on single elderly women's grandchild care hours with an
estimated marginal impact conditional on providing care of -5.67 weekly hours in speciﬁcation
(4). On the other hand, the reform does not seem to have had any impact on married elderly
women. As for net ﬁnancial transfers, the reform seems to have had a positive impact once we
control for demographic and economic variables in speciﬁcation (4). However, the estimated
impacts are not signiﬁcant.
Overall, for intergenerational families living together, the 1996 reform seems to have mainly
crowded out grandmother provided care for single grandmothers. It is possible that while the
young mothers are not adjusting labour supply and therefore not experiencing higher child
care needs, the grandmothers are working more and providing lower grandchild care hours as
a result. Interestingly, the estimated magnitude of marginal eﬀects are very similar for hours
of work and hours of care in all four speciﬁcations for single grandmothers suggesting some
time constraint eﬀect on the part of the elderly women.
5.2.2 Intergenerational Families Living Apart
In this section, we report results for intergenerational families living apart. Tables 9S and 9M
report the estimated average treatment eﬀects of the 1996 reform on young women's labour
force participation for the samples of single and married grandmothers respectively. The
reform seems to have had a small positive and signiﬁcant impact on labour force participation
of eligible young mothers and on their non eligible adult sisters as well. However, this positive
impact becomes small and insigniﬁcant for the eligible young mothers with a living single
elderly mother once we control for demographic variables.
Tables 10S and 10M report the estimated average treatment eﬀects of the 1996 reform on
elderly women's labour supply for the samples of single and married grandmothers respec-
tively. The reform does not seem to have aﬀected labour supply behaviour, with small and
insigniﬁcant impacts. Tables 11S and 11M report the estimated impacts on intergenerational
transfers of time and money. The only notable impact is the big increase in intergenerational
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transfers of money from single elderly women.
Overall, the reform seems to have increased labour supply of young women in treatment
families when the intergenerational families live apart. However, in the sample of single elderly
women, the impact of the reform on labour supply of eligible adult daughters seems limited
while there is considerable crowding in of ﬁnancial transfers from the elderly women. It is
possible that for this type of family, the eligible young mothers prefer not to adjust labour
supply and leave welfare. In this case, child care needs do not change since the young mothers
can still look after their children. However, the loss in welfare beneﬁts could be causing an
income eﬀect requiring more ﬁnancial help from the elderly grandmothers.
5.3 Discussion
Our baseline results suggest that the PRWORA reform eﬀects on intergenerational families
were mainly on single elderly women. While the reform seems to have increased labour force
participation of young women, elderly women were decreasing time transfers and increasing
money transfers. Intergenerational families living together seems to have experienced small
insigniﬁcant impacts on labour force participation of young women while single elderly women
increased labour supply and decreased hours of grandchild care. On the other hand, inter-
generational families living separately seem to have experienced bigger and more signiﬁcant
positive impacts on labour force participation of the young women while single elderly women
increased ﬁnancial transfers. This suggests that proximity might play a role in determining
how intergenerational families react to the reform31.
It is possible that elderly women living close to their adult daughters were already much
involved in grandchild care so that the higher child care subsidies helped encourage a substi-
tution away from grandmother provided child care to formal care. On the other hand, elderly
women living far away might not have been as much involved in grandchild care. However,
with the reform generating a negative income eﬀect on those who leave welfare and higher
child care needs for the young women who increased labour supply, the elderly women might
choose instead to respond by increasing money transfers.
31Similar regressions for intergenerational families living within 10 miles of each other yielded similar impacts
as for families living together with smaller eﬀects on hours of care and bigger eﬀects on net ﬁnancial transfers.
Of course, living arrangement or proximity could be endogenous in the sense that low skilled families might
have a tendency to live closer to each other. In this case, our control group would be comprised of high skilled
families who live close by because they have a preference to live close to each other, thereby leading to a
negative correlation between the unobserved error component and our treatment group variable. We would
expect this to lead to an underestimation of the average treatment on treated eﬀect estimated here. Controlling
for ﬁxed eﬀects as we did in regressions could mitigate such eﬀect on the assumption that the preferences for
close proximity are captured by our ﬁxed eﬀect term.
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6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the impact of welfare reforms on intergenerational transfers and labour
supply behaviour of intergenerational families. The 1996 reform had three main components
which could directly aﬀect the labour force participation of low income mothers: (1) stricter
work requirements, (2) time limits on beneﬁts and (3) increased child care funding.
Our results from the PSID indicate that the TANF reform has increased both work par-
ticipation and labour hours of low educated young mothers. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the 1996
PRWORA had stronger signiﬁcant eﬀects compared to the early 1990's waivers. Results from
our intergenerational analysis using HRS also indicate an increase in labour force participa-
tion of the eligible group of young mothers. However, the impact of this increase is small and
insigniﬁcant for intergenerational families living together.
The reform seems to have had important impacts on single elderly women. For this type
of family, we observe crowding out of intergenerational time transfers and crowding in of
intergenerational ﬁnancial transfers, as well as a slight increase in the labour supply of elderly
women. This result suggests that while stronger work requirements and time limits on beneﬁts
could have motivated young mothers to increase labour supply and thereby be in greater
need of child care, it is possible that the impact of child care subsidies could be important
in motivating low income families to substitute from informal grandmother care to formal
day care, thereby enabling the grandmother to work longer hours on the market and give
more ﬁnancial help to their adult daughters. Moreover, for those young mothers who were
motivated to leave the TANF program as a result of stricter work requirements and time
limits, it is possible that the loss in welfare beneﬁts contributed to the crowding in of private
intertergenerational transfers of money from the elderly women. We found no impact for
married elderly women.
Our ﬁndings imply that one cannot consider a nuclear family in isolation when evaluating
the impact of welfare reforms. Such welfare-to-work reforms might not only aﬀect the distri-
bution of private intergenerational transfers but might also have potential repercussions on the
labour supply behaviour of other members of the intergenerational family network. This raises
questions about whether welfare-to-work reforms should take into account intergenerational
family members or whether the social security beneﬁts formula should account for say, the
potential risks of grandchild care giving. The next natural step for this research would be a
demarcation from the reduced form analysis presented here, and into a proper understanding
of the basis on which intergenerational families make decisions and share resources, so as to
be able to assess the implications of each component of welfare reforms on intergenerational
family members.
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A Appendix
A.1 Comparison Groups
Example 1: Elderly Woman with One Adult Working Age Daughter Consider an intergen-
erational family with one adult elderly woman and one adult working age daughter. In our diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences analysis on the eligible young women outcomes, we therefore use as treatment the eligible
adult working age daughter in the treatment families and as control the non eligible adult working age
daughter in the control families as illustrated in the top panel of the ﬁgure below. Similarly, when
looking at elderly women's outcomes, we use as treatment the elderly woman in the treatment families
and as control the elderly women in the control families as illustrated in the bottom panel of the ﬁgure
below.
Elderly Woman
Working Age Eligible
Adult Daughter
Elderly Woman
Working Age Non Eligible
Adult Daughter
Treatment Control
Elderly Woman
Working Age Eligible
Adult Daughter
Elderly Woman
Working Age Non Eligible
Adult Daughter
Example 2: Elderly Woman with 2 Adult Working Age Daughters and One Adult Work-
ing Age Son Now imagine an intergenerational family with 3 adult children. In this case, when
looking at eligible working age female outcomes, we use as treatment eligible working age young women
in treatment families and as controls non eligible working age young women in control families as il-
lustrated below.
Elderly Woman
Young
Woman
Elderly Woman
Treatment Control
Eligible Not 
Eligible
Young
Man
Young
Woman
Young
Woman
Young
Man
Young
Woman
Not
Eligible
Not
Eligible
Not
Eligible
Not
Eligible
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When looking at adult sisters outcomes, we use as treatment working age non eligible sisters in
treatment families and as control non eligible working age daughters in control families as illustrated
below.
Elderly Woman
Young
Woman
Elderly Woman
Treatment Control
Eligible Not 
Eligible
Young
Man
Young
Woman
Young
Woman
Young
Man
Young
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Not
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Not
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Finally, when looking at elderly women's outcomes, we use as treatment elderly women in treatment
families and as control elderly women in control families as illustrated below.
Elderly Woman
Young
Woman
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Treatment Control
Eligible Not 
Eligible
Young
Man
Young
Woman
Young
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Young
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Not
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Not
Eligible
Not
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Not
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A.2 Transfers in the HRS
The family module of the HRS asks speciﬁc questions about grandchild care provision (hours transfers)
and ﬁnancial transfers to and from the adult children. Interviews are retrospective e.g. the 2000 wave
asked about hours of care and ﬁnancial transfers provided altogether in 1998 and 1999.
We construct our hours care variable from the questions:
• Did you (or your husband/or your wife/or your partner/.../or your late husband/or your late wife/or
your late partner) spend 100 or more hours in total (since Previous Wave Interview Month-Year/in the
last two years) taking care of (grand or great-grandchildren/grandchildren)?
• Roughly how many hours altogether did you spend?
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Thus, the HRS questionnaire asks a ﬁrst question about whether any member of the grandparent
household spent 100 hours or more in the last two years (equivalently about 1 hour per week) taking
care of grandchildren. If the answer is aﬃrmative, the respondent is then asked the number of hours
spent taking care of grandchildren. We treat great-grandchildren as grandchildren in our analysis and
do not seek to distinguish between them. We divide the amount of hours of grandchild care by 104 to
construct our weekly hours of grandchild care variable.
The HRS also asks a series of questions on ﬁnancial transfers between generations. The deﬁnition of
ﬁnancial transfers in the HRS corresponds to intervivos transfers and excludes bequests. The questions
relating to intervivos transfers in the HRS are outlined below.
• Financial transfers from grandparent generation to adult children:
 Including help with education but not shared housing ...or shared food or any deed to a house,(...in
the last two years) did you (or your husband/or your wife/or your partner/.../or your late hus-
band/or your late wife/or your late partner) give ﬁnancial help totaling $500 or more to any of
your children (or grandchildren)?
 ...about how much was that altogether during the period ...
• Financial transfers from adult children to grandparent generation:
 (Since Previous Wave Interview Month-Year/In the last two years) did you (or your husband/or
your wife/or your partner/.../or your late husband/or your late wife/or your late partner) receive
ﬁnancial help totaling $500... or more from your child? ELSE or more from any of your children?
 About how much did that amount to ...
Thus, the HRS questionnaire ﬁrst asks whether transfers of more than $500 were made over the past
two years (roughly equivalent to $5 a week) and if aﬃrmative, the respondent is then asked to state the
amount of transfers given and/or received. We treat ﬁnancial transfers from grandparent generation
to grandchild generation as ﬁnancial transfers from grandparent generation to adult children and add
them together. We then subtract ﬁnancial transfers from adult children to grandparent generation
and divide the total by 104 to construct our weekly net ﬁnancial transfers variable.
A.3 1996 Social Security Earnings Test Reform
In 1996, the Contract with America Advancement Act legislation raised the annual earnings test
exempt amount for recipients who have attained the full retirement age. Such a reform could have
potentially aﬀected the retirement behaviour of low income elderly women and if that is the case, we
would not be able to diﬀerentiate the impact of such a reform from the TANF reform. We argue that
in theory, the earnings test reform should have only changed incentives of low income elderly women
in terms of work hours, but not in terms of their labour force participation decisions. This is because,
those who were below the earnings test threshold, including those who were not working, would not
be aﬀected by the raise in the annual earnings test exempt amount. On the other hand, those who
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are likely to be aﬀected, would be expected to change work hours but not change their labour force
participation decision.
To see this, let us consider a simple static model of labour supply as illustrated in Figure 6. Before
Figure 6: 1996 Earnings Test Reform
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Leisure
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the reform, the individual had a choice between being on budget constraint LKJFE if she does not
claim social security, or budget constraint LKJHGFE if she decides to claim social security. Since we
are looking at a one period model, the individual would therefore choose to be on the higher budget
constraint LKJHGFE, where between DE hours of leisure she receives social security beneﬁts SS
but between BD hours of leisure, the social security beneﬁts are withdrawn at a certain rate, say γ.
Now let there be a reform which increases the earnings test threshold such that new budget
constraint is now LKIHGFE. Clearly those who were previously consuming between DE amount of
leisure are not aﬀected by the reform and this includes those who were previously not working, at G.
On the other hand, those who were consuming between B and C hours of leisure face a pure income
eﬀect and might therefore choose to decrease hours of work and consume more leisure. Those who were
previously either on segments AB or CD, on the other hand, face both income and substitution eﬀects
so that impact on work hours is ambiguous. However, we do not expect anyone who was previously
working to get out of the labour force since point G was previously available but not chosen, and the
old budget set is also still attainable (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference). Thus, in a static labour
supply model, one does not expect the 1996 earnings test reform to change labour force participation
incentives.
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B Young Women's Labour Supply Behaviour
In this section, we analyse the theoretical predictions about the potential impacts of welfare reform on
the labour supply behaviour of young women and estimate the impact of the reform on their labour
supply at both the extensive and the intensive margins. We use the standard labour supply framework
to model labour supply behaviour of married couples, i.e., if a woman is married, she treats her spouse's
earnings as her unearned income so that the husband's labour supply decision only has an income eﬀect
on her behaviour.
B.1 How would Eligible Young Mothers be Aﬀected?
To keep things simple, let us start by looking at the three major components of welfare reform sepa-
rately: (1) strict work requirements, (2) time limits on beneﬁts and (3) child care subsidies.
Work Requirements Figure 7 illustrates a simple case of imposition of work requirements on an
individual in a simple consumption-leisure framework. Suppose for simplicity that there is no change
in welfare beneﬁt levels and in the beneﬁt reduction rate.
Figure 7: Imposition of Work Requirements
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Let the no welfare budget constraint be given by aehdgjb with slope of w, the wage. Suppose now
that the government introduces welfare and pays a certain beneﬁt to all individuals and withdrawn
at a rate τ as the individual earnings increase. New budget constraint is given by acdgjb. Clearly,
any utility maximising individual previously on segment aeh has an incentive to locate on the higher
budget constraint and be on welfare.
Now suppose that the government introduces a work requirement ofHL hours as was the case under
the JOBS program under AFDC rule. New budget constraint is given by aefgjb. If an individual
works less than HL hours, then she does not get any beneﬁt and faces the no welfare budget constraint.
On the other hand, if she meets the work requirements, she gets welfare beneﬁts which are withdrawn
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at a rate τ as her earnings increase. The new budget constraint therefore has slope of (1− τ)w on
segment fg.
Those individuals who were previously on segment cd and either not working or working less than
HL hours, now have higher incentives to work HL hours or more and relocate to point f on the
new budget constraint, so that we expect very low income individuals to increase their labour supply
at both the intensive and the extensive margin. On the other hand, those who were previously on
welfare and working more than HL face a pure income eﬀect and may decrease hours of work. We
however, do not expect them to work less than HL hours or to get out of the labour force by the weak
axiom of revealed preference (since those options were previously attainable but not chosen by those
individuals).
Now suppose that the government increases work requirements further to HH as was the case
under TANF. New budget constraint is now given by aehijb. In this case, those who were previously
on welfare and working less than HH hours have an incentive to either increase labour supply and
relocate to point i on the new budget constraint, or leave welfare and relocate on segment aeh of the
no welfare budget constraint. Moreover, we do not expect individuals who were previously working
more than HH hours to work less than HH hours or to get out of the labour force by the weak axiom of
revealed preference. It is therefore generally expected that stricter work requirements would increase
labour supply for low skilled individuals either because they have to increase labour supply to remain
on welfare, or because they leave welfare and have to become ﬁnancially independent.
Time Limit While under AFDC, time limits for receiving beneﬁts were in eﬀect indeﬁnite (so long
that one satisﬁed the eligibility criteria), under TANF, families have a 60 months maximum lifetime
limit for receiving beneﬁts from federal funds. The introduction of a maximum time limit of ﬁve
cumulative years is expected to increase incentives to work. As Grogger (2003, 2005) points out, time
limits have a mechanical eﬀect and a behavioral eﬀect.
The mechanical eﬀect is straightforward since individuals become automatically ineligible for wel-
fare beneﬁts after the expiry of the time limit. On the other hand, the behavioral eﬀect would depend
on whether individuals are forward looking enough. The intuition is that if individuals are forward
looking, they would want to preserve eligibility as a safety net for future hardships. Thus, individuals
would prefer to leave welfare and work more today rather than be on welfare and lose eligibility. This
is particularly true for individuals with young children, who have a longer horizon over which to decide
whether to apply for welfare or not.
Grogger & al (2005) present this intuition by using a simple option value type model. Consider
an individual who has to decide whether to just satisfy the minimum work requirements and be on
welfare today, or to preserve future eligibility by leaving welfare today and working more. A short
sighted individual might just make the comparison between current utility of being on welfare and
current utility of not being on welfare. In Figure 8, this could be represented by a comparison of U (i)
against U (k). Clearly, this short sighted individual would choose to be on welfare at point i since
utility of being on welfare is strictly higher than utility of not being on welfare U (i) > U (k).
Now, consider a forward looking individual. Let St be the stock of eligibility months left at
period t and let the discount factor be β. If the individual chooses to be on welfare today and
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Figure 8: Time Limits
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Diagram based on Figure 3.4 in Grogger & Karoly (2005)
satisfy the minimum work requirement, then she gets current utility U (i) plus the discounted value
of expected utility of the remaining stock of eligibility βEV (St − 1) so that total expected utility is
U (i)+βEV (St − 1). On the other hand, if the individual chooses to leave welfare and work to preserve
eligibility, she gets current utility U (k) plus the discounted value of expected utility of the stock of
eligibility βEV (St) so that total expected utility is U (k) + βEV (St). Comparing U (k) + βEV (St)
against U (i) + βEV (St − 1) is similar to comparing U (k) against U (i) − β [EV (St)− EV (St − 1)]
where the term in squared bracket is positive since higher future eligibility is expected to yield higher
expected utility. Since U (i) − β [EV (St)− EV (St − 1)] < U (i) , if individuals are forward looking,
they would therefore have higher incentives to leave welfare and work more today so as to preserve
future eligibility.
Grogger (2003) shows that the reform had stronger impacts on the labour force participation of
those with younger children (and therefore longer eligibility horizon), which is consistent with the fact
that individuals might choose to work more today so as to preserve eligibility as back up plan against
future uncertainty. Also, Swann (2003) uses a discrete choice dynamic programming model to show
that time limits would increase labour force participation if individuals are forward looking.
Child Care Subsidies The 1996 PRWORA also combined four diﬀerent child care programs into
a single block grant fund, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), whose main goal is to
facilitate transition from welfare to work. Under PRWORA, states were required to maintain at least
100% of their 1994 or 1995 child care expenditures whichever is highest. Moreover, states are allowed
to transfer up to 30% of their federal TANF allocation to the CCDF. From 1996 to 2002, federal
funding totalling more than $69 billion supported the child care needs of low income working families
with a rise of 89% in child care subsidies between 1993 and 2000.
Since most child care subsidies are conditioned on employment, one would expect that child care
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subsidies provision would encourage work participation of low income families. Increased child care
funding can lower the ﬁxed cost of work and therefore encourage labour force participation. Moreover,
if the subsidy is introduced on an hourly expense basis, one would expect a substitution from parental
to formal or centre based care, thereby allowing parents to work.
Consider a young mother who faces the decision to work or not. If she works, she has to employ a
minimum level of child care hours. Let hF denote hours of child care and let hF denote the minimum
hours of care than has to be used. Budget constraint in this case is given by abcd and ﬁxed cost of
work is wFhF as illustrated in Figure 9. Young mothers with high ﬁxed costs of work therefore have
low incentives to work.
Figure 9: Child Care Subsidies
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Now, consider the introduction of per hour child care subsidies s by the government32. The child
care subsidies would not only reduce the ﬁxed costs of work but also reduce the per hour cost of child
care so that new budget constraint is given by aefg as illustrated in Figure 9. Clearly, those who
were previously at a and not working, now have higher incentives to work. Those who were previously
on segment cd and working, now face lower per hour child care costs and eﬀectively higher net of
child care cost wages. Since, the substitution eﬀect tends to dominate the income eﬀect for low skilled
individuals, we therefore expect child care subsidies to increase labour supply at both the extensive
and the intensive margins.
B.2 Data
We use Panel Study of Income Dynamics data corresponding to years 1991 to 2001. The PSID is
a longitudinal dataset of individuals starting in 1968 and conducted yearly until 1997 when it was
32Under PRWORA, states have to oﬀer certiﬁcates (vouchers) to allow families to purchase care from any legally
operating child care provider. The subsidy amount is required to cover the fee charged by the provider at the 75th
percentile of the market rate distribution. States are also required to have a sliding scale fee structure with the fees
rising with family income.
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conducted biennially onwards33. We limit the sample to young women aged between 18 to 49 and
split them into a treatment group and a control group. A woman is considered as eligible for TANF
beneﬁts if she has a child under 18, has less than high school and is single or married with husband
unemployed.
Summary statistics for treatment and control families are reported in Table B1. Families in the
treatment group (T) tend to be poorer, less educated, more likely to be black and are in poorer health
than those in the control group (C).
B.3 Empirical Strategy
B.3.1 Speciﬁcation
We exploit state variation in implementation dates for the waivers and for the 1996 PRWORA legisla-
tion to identify the impact of the 1996 reform separately from those of the early 1990's waivers34. We
also exploit diﬀerences between treatment and control groups as deﬁned above to identify the average
treatment eﬀect on the treated, so that we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy.
For the sample of young working age women, we are interested in two particular outcomes, labour
force participation and hours of work. Since we only observe binary outcomes for labour force par-
ticipation while hours of work are observed only when an individual is working, we consider latent
variable models of the following form:
Y ∗ist = α+ δWaiver · (Treatgroupi ·Waiverst) + δTANF · (Treatgroupi · TANFst)
+β′Xist + θ′Est + EITCit + µg + µs + µt + µi + ist (3)
where
Treatgroupi is a group dummy variable taking value one if individual i is in a treatment family
Waiverst is a dummy variable taking value one if individual i lives in a state s which had a waiver
in place in year t
TANFst is a dummy variable taking value one if individual i lives in a state s which had their
TANF program in place in year t
Xist is a vector of demographic controls. These includes second order polynomials in age, wealth,
unearned income, education, work experience before the reform, number of children aged under 2,
between 2 and 5, and between 5 and 18, dummy variables for health, ethnicity, whether own a house
and marital status
Est is a vector of economic controls. These include average unemployment rate and average wage
of child care workers in state of residence
33For the years in between the biennial interviews, we took the average of the variables between the preceding year and
the following year. Questions concerning labour supply include current labour force participation and previous year's
weekly hours of work. We consider a women as working in the previous year if she reported positive weekly hours of
work.
34Implementation dates are based on information compiled by The Oﬃce of Human Services Policy [US Department
of Health and Human Services] and are provided in Appendix Table B
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EITCit is the maximum receivable EITC beneﬁts in year t and varies with family size
µg = Treatgroupi is a group ﬁxed eﬀect
µs is a vector of state dummies
µt is a vector of year dummies
µi is an individual ﬁxed eﬀect
B.3.2 Estimation
As in Section 4.4, we use a Mundlak (1978) type assumption and assume that the ﬁxed eﬀects can be
modelled as a linear function of the means of the exogenous explanatory variables35.
µi = ψ′X¯i + ai , ai ∼ N
(
0, σ2a
)
where X¯i = 1Ti
∑
ti
Xit is the average of the demographic variables for individual i and ai is assumed
to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and follows a normal distribution.
We can therefore rewrite the latent variable models as
Y ∗ist = α+ δWaiver · (Treatgroupi ·Waiverst) + δTANF · (Treatgroupi · TANFst)
+β′Xist + θ′Est + EITCit + µs + µt + ψ′X¯i + ai + ist (4)
= γ′Z+ ai + ist
Under the assumption that the transitory error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables
and is identically independently normally distributed, ist ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
, we can therefore estimate the
labour force participation equation using random eﬀects probit and the hours of work equation using
random eﬀects tobit.
B.4 Results
Results for young working age women's labour supply is reported in Table B2. We estimate three
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In speciﬁcation (1), we only control for state and time eﬀects. The implemen-
tation of the TANF seems to have had a signiﬁcant and positive impact on labour force participation of
young women in treatment families. This is consistent with the ﬁndings in the mainstream literature.
However, marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean although positive are small and insigniﬁcant. Also,
the early 1990's waivers did not seem to have had much impact on labour force participation. We
however recognise that it is possible that the TANF estimates are capturing some lagged impacts of
the early waivers especially since some waiver components such as work requirements gave welfare
35We also did preliminary regressions using ﬁxed eﬀects ordinary least squares. The marginal eﬀects derived from the
linear probability model for the labour force participation equation were slightly bigger and more signiﬁcant than in our
ﬁxed eﬀect probit models. On the other hand, the marginal eﬀects derived from ordinary least squares regression on
hours of work were slightly smaller than when we control for selection using ﬁxed eﬀects tobit models. All coeﬃcients
were qualitatively similar and as signiﬁcant in both the linear and the non linear speciﬁcations.
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recipients up to two years to comply with the requirements. The implementation eﬀect of the waivers
could therefore have a lagged eﬀect coinciding with the implementation dates for the TANF.
In speciﬁcation (2), we control for demographic variables and for individual ﬁxed eﬀects a` la
Mundlak (1978). The estimated impact of the TANF on labour force participation is now smaller
with smaller coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects. In speciﬁcation (3), we control for potential economic
diﬀerences over time and across states by controlling for economic variables such as the average unem-
ployment rate and average wage of child care workers in the state of residence. We also control for the
potential impacts of the EITC by including the maximum potential EITC beneﬁts in the regressions.
Once again the introduction of the TANF seems to have had positive and signiﬁcant impacts on labour
force participation as compared to the waivers, with slightly smaller coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects
than in the previous speciﬁcations.
The introduction of the 1996 PRWORA legislation also seems to have had a positive and signiﬁcant
impact on labour supply of young working age eligible mothers at the intensive margin. Weekly hours
of work of young mothers seems to have increased by 3 hours on average conditional on working. Once
again, as we control for demographic and economic variables, the estimated impact of the TANF gets
slightly smaller but nevertheless stays positive and strongly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
One potential concern in our analysis is the same trends assumption made in our diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis. After all, it is possible that women with diﬀerent education levels
might have diﬀerent trends. At ﬁrst glance, from Figure 1, our treatment and control groups did not
seem to have diﬀerent trends. We also performed similar regressions as in equation (4) by interacting
our treatgroupi variable with each year instead ofWaiverst and TANFst. As can be seen in Appendix
Table B3, both groups seem to have had similar trends with the coeﬃcient on labour supply becoming
strongly positive and signiﬁcant only after 1997 which coincides with the TANF implementation period.
Finally, as a last check, we limited the sample to young women with less than high school education,
so that our treatment group still consists of low educated women with children while our control group
now only consists of low educated women without children. Results are reported in Appendix Table
B4. The estimated coeﬃcients are very similar to those of Table B2 with slightly smaller marginal
eﬀects for hours of work. This tends to suggest that our common trends assumption is not far fetched
and that our results are in line with the results found so far in the welfare reform literature.
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C Intergenerational Family Model
In this section, we outline a formal model of intergenerational family decision making. Assume that
we have two agents: (1) G an elderly woman (the grandmother) and (2) M a young working age
woman with young children (the middle generation). Under the assumption that the two agents are
cooperating to make eﬃcient family decisions, the family problem can be represented as a family utility
maximisation problem
V (At, St) = Max{CG,LG,hG,CM ,hM ,hF ,Welfare}
U
[
uG
(
CGt , L
G
t , h
G
t
)
, uM
(
CMt , h
M
t , h
G
t
)]
+ βEtV (At+1, St+1) (5)
s.t.
Family Budget Constraint ∀t
CGt + C
M
t + w
F
t h
F · 1
{
hFt ≤ hF
}
+ wFt h
F
t · 1
{
hFt > h
F
}
+At+1 (6)
= At + Y Gt + w
G
t H
G
t + Y
M
t + w
M
t H
M
t +Bt · 1 {Welfaret = 1} · 1 {St > 0}
Time Constraints ∀t
LGt +H
G
t + h
G
t + φ · 1 {Distancet = Far} = T − γ · 1
{
HealthGt = Bad
}
(7)
hMt +H
M
t = Tt (8)
Child Care Constraint ∀t
HMt = h
F
t + h
G
t (9)
Work Requirement ∀t
HMt ≥ HMt if Welfaret = 1 (10)
Eligibility Stock ∀t
St+1 = St − 1 {Welfaret = 1} (11)
St+1 ≥ 0
Each period, the family chooses consumption of each generation CG, CM , leisure of the grand-
mother LG, hours of care from the grandmother hG, hours of care from the young woman hM , hours
of formal care hF and whether to claim beneﬁts today Welfare.
Preferences G values her own consumption CG, her leisure LG and her contribution to child care hG
while M values her own consumption CM , her contribution to child care hM and the elderly woman's
contribution to child care hG.
Child Care In this setting, we assume that the young woman does not have any pure leisure but that
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any time not devoted to market work HM is devoted to child care hM . Formal child care costs wFper
hour hF and if the family decides to use formal care, it needs to employ it for a minimum of hF hours.
On the other hand, grandmother care cost is measured by the opportunity cost of grandmother's time
which is represented by her potential wage on the formal market wG. Moreover, if the grandmother
lives far away, she incurs a ﬁxed time cost of φ due to travelling time.
Constraints Family budget constraint is given by equation (6) which states that the value of con-
sumption of both generations and of formal care must be equal to the sum of assets at the beginning
of the period At, unearned income of each generation Y , earnings of each generation wH and welfare
beneﬁts B if the young woman claims TANF beneﬁts provided that her current stock of eligibility St
is positive. However, if she claims beneﬁts, she has a minimum work requirement of HM imposed on
her illustrated by constraint (10). She also loses eligibility years represented by the equation of motion
for eligibility stock (11).
Welfare Reform As can be seen from the family problem, the imposition of stricter work require-
ment would increase HM in equation (10). Those families where the young woman was previously
working less than HM might thus have to increase labour supply of the young woman to stay on
welfare or leave welfare. On the other hand, the time limits on beneﬁts eﬀectively decrease the stock
of eligibility years from indeﬁnite (provided that the young women satisﬁed AFDC eligibility criteria)
to the federal limit of 5 years in equation (11) thereby providing higher incentives for young families
to leave welfare today so as to preserve the future stock of eligibility. Meanwhile child care subsidies
would have the eﬀect of decreasing cost of formal care wF , thereby leading to a substitution from
grandmother to formal care.
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Young Women
Proportion Working
Education
Age
Number of Children
Owns a House
No. of Observations
Non Eligible Adult Sisters
Proportion Working
Education
Age
Number of Children
Owns a House
No. of Observations
1.6
(1.31)
0.59
(0.49)
27,495
34.8
(5.66)
(0.42)
13.5
(2.11)
27,495
0.77
0.59
(0.49)
1.6
(1.31)
(2.11)
34.8
(5.66)
3,066
0.77
(0.42)
13.5
(1.46)
0.43
(0.50)
34.9
(5.79)
1.98
12.3
(2.13)
0.68
(0.47)
0.18
(0.39)
(6.55)
1.91
(1.60)
0.52
33.4
Variable
2,320
Treatment Control
(0.50)
10.1
(2.49)
Table 1: Summary Statistics for HRS - Young Women Sample
Young Women Family Sample
Variable
T C T C
Proportion Retired 0.65 0.51 0.57 0.55
(0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Proportion Working 0.32 0.54 0.42 0.47
(0.47) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Weekly Hours Work (if>0) 35.2 36.2 35.3 34.2
(11.6) (13.00) (13.60) (14.10)
Provided Time Transfers 0.61 0.49 0.51 0.49
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Provided Money 0.2 0.31 0.27 0.39
(0.40) (0.46) (0.45) (0.49)
Time Transfers (if >0) 15.4 8.68 11.8 8.6
(23.7) (13.7) (15.9) (13.6)
Money Transfers (if>0) 51 64.6 45 91
(178.0) (132) (51.0) (264)
Other Income (per week) 151 253 578 1,112
(494) (601) (472) (1414)
Wealth ($'000) 27.5 148 116 419
(57.8) (290) (204.0) (890)
Education 9.4 12 9.89 12.2
(3.37) (2.75) (3.42) (2.60)
Black 0.37 0.31 0.22 0.1
(0.48) (0.46) (0.42) (0.30)
Years of Work Experience 22.7 26.6 22.9 23.4
(15.1) (14.3) (14.7) (14.4)
Number of Children 5.2 3.76 5.84 3.9
(2.15) (1.84) (2.86) (1.91)
Health 0.46 0.71 0.63 0.81
(0.50) (0.45) (0.48) (0.39)
Age 61 61.3 59.8 59.6
(4.37) (4.47) (4.68) (4.70)
No. of Observations 695 3,874 900 10,961
GM Single GM Married
Table 1: Summary Statistics for HRS - Elderly Women Sample
Elderly Women Sample
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
Eligible Females
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.267 0.063 0.184 0.045 0.181 0.044 0.181 0.044
(0.064) (0.013) (0.065) (0.015) (0.065) (0.015) (0.065) (0.015)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Sisters LFP
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.116 0.029 0.126 0.031 0.127 0.031 0.118 0.029
(0.059) (0.014) (0.060) (0.014) (0.060) (0.014) (0.060) (0.014)
** ** ** ** ** ** * **
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x
Economic x x
EITC x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on MG Sample.
Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high school education, 
being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  
Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and  dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy 
variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include 
second order polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies
or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions  include average unemployment rate and average wage of child care
workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
30561 30561 30561 30561
-14,979 -14,526 -14,469 -14,469
29815 29815 29815 29815
-14,716 -14,310 -14,267 -14,251
Table 2: Young Women's Labour Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
GM Retirement
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -0.056 -0.022 -0.045 -0.018 -0.015 -0.006 0.090 0.034
(0.105) (0.041) (0.107) (0.041) (0.119) (0.046) (0.128) (0.048)
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
GM Work
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.090 0.036 0.079 0.031 0.076 0.030 -0.047 -0.018
(0.109) (0.043) (0.112) (0.044) (0.128) (0.050) (0.138) (0.053)
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
GM Hours Work
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 1.115 0.480 1.009 0.407 0.685 0.275 -1.292 -0.509
(1.393) (0.605) (1.401) (0.571) (1.595) (0.645) (1.718) (0.669)
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x
Economic x x
EITC x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample.
Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high school education, 
being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  
Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and  dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy 
variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include 
second order polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies
or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions  include average unemployment rate and average wage of child care
workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
16,429 16,429 16,429 16,429
16,429 16,429 16,429 16,429
16,429 16,429 16,429 16,429
-8,163 -7,295 -7,271 -7,262
-7,810 -6,869 -6,839 -6,830
-42,037 -41,0347 -41,010 -41,008
Table 3: Elderly Women's Labour Supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
GM Retirement
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -0.155 -0.061 -0.076 -0.030 0.066 0.025 0.131 0.050 -0.077 -0.030 -0.050 -0.019 -0.037 -0.014 0.064 0.024
(0.181) (0.072) (0.184) (0.073) (0.209) (0.080) (0.228) (0.086) (0.136) (0.054) (0.138) (0.053) (0.156) (0.060) (0.166) (0.062)
Log Likelihood
GM Work
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.284 0.113 0.279 0.111 0.308 0.122 0.256 0.102 0.093 0.037 0.062 0.024 -0.002 -0.001 -0.142 -0.053
(0.185) (0.072) (0.191) (0.075) (0.225) (0.088) (0.242) (0.095) (0.143) (0.057) (0.147) (0.057) (0.167) (0.064) (0.180) (0.065)
Log Likelihood
GM Hours Work
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 2.373 1.045 2.215 0.949 1.213 0.515 0.966 0.409 1.617 0.691 1.632 0.647 0.720 0.282 -1.638 -0.627
(2.240) (1.003) (2.234) (0.978) (2.577) (1.108) (2.817) (1.205) (1.792) (0.776) (1.811) (0.729) (2.054) (0.811) (2.180) (0.821)
Log Likelihood
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x x x x x
Economic x x x x
EITC x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
No. of Obs.
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample. Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high 
school education, being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and
dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include second order 
polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions include average  unemployment rate 
and average wage of child care workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4)(1) (2) (3) (4)
-2,179 -1,804 -1,779 -1,777 -6,050 -5,430 -5,412 -5,405
-2,128 -1,768 -1,743 -1,741 -5,720 -5,019 -4,996 -4,989
-12335 -11930 -11901 -11902 -30,010 -29,297 -29,250 -29,234
4,568 4,568
Table 3 Cont'd: Elderly Women's Labour Supply
Table 3S: Single Elderly Woman Table 3M: Married Elderly Woman
11,861 11,861 11,861 11,8614,568 4,568
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
GM Hours Care
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -2.726 -0.776 -2.479 -0.705 -3.136 -0.879 -2.734 -0.771
(1.036) (0.282) (1.043) (0.285) (1.187) (0.316) (1.278) (0.345)
*** *** ** ** *** *** ** **
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Net Financial Transfers
(Treatgroup)*(Reform)
R2
No. of Obs.
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x
Economic x x
EITC x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample.
Fixed effects ordinary least squares regressions form net financial transfers
Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high school education, 
being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  
Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and  dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy 
variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include 
second order polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies
or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions  include average unemployment rate and average wage of child care
workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
(5.294) (5.325) (5.700) (5.998)
-0.033 2.926 3.492 0.166
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
16,429 16,429 16,429 16,429
16,429 16,429 16,429 16,429
-37,498 -37,412 -37,323 -37,320
Table 4: Intergenerational Transfers from Elderly Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
GM Hours Care
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -6.707 -1.689 -6.330 -1.589 -7.034 -1.736 -6.228 -1.553 -0.271 -0.082 -0.331 -0.100 -0.921 -0.274 -1.118 -0.332
(1.894) (0.437) (1.904) (0.440) (2.182) (0.490) (2.393) (0.549) (1.304) (0.394) (1.305) (0.392) (1.481) (0.434) (1.572) (0.458)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Log Likelihood
Net Financial Transfers
(Treatgroup)*(Reform)
R2
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x x x x x
Economic x x x x
EITC x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
No. of Obs.
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample. Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high 
school education, being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and
dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include second order 
polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions include average  unemployment rate 
and average wage of child care workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
Table 4S: Single Elderly Woman Table 4M: Married Elderly Woman
4,568 4,568 4,568 4,568 11,861 11,861 11,861 11,861
(1) (2) (3) (4)(1) (2) (3) (4)
-25,144 -25,142-8,706 -8,663 -8,607 -8,606
-4.695 -8.44917.325 18.432 19.598 20.941
(7.284) (7.663)(9.426) (9.546) (9.155) (9.446)
* * ** **
0.01 0.010.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
(6.572) (6.494)
-5.693 -4.891
-25,271 -25,205
Table 4Cont'd: Intergenerational Transfers from Elderly Women
Variable
T C T C T C T C
Young Women
Proportion Working 0.35 0.72 0.43 0.72 0.5 0.76 0.53 0.77
(0.48) (0.45) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50) (0.43) (0.50) (0.42)
Education 9.6 12.8 10.1 13.1 9.85 13.3 10.2 13.9
(2.52) (1.90) (2.59) (1.76) (2.27) (2.12) (2.02) (5.40)
Age 33.2 32.8 29.7 29.8 35.2 36.1 34 34.9
(6.45) (6.34) (6.49) (5.94) (5.88) (5.44) (6.19) (5.40)
Number of Children 1.88 1.46 1.17 1.23 2.3 1.75 2.11 1.64
(1.34) (1.15) (1.32) (1.01) (1.57) (1.36) (1.59) (1.29)
Owns a House 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.2 0.54 0.22 0.65
(0.18) (0.36) (0.13) (0.26) (0.40) (0.50) (0.41) (0.48)
No. of Observations 114 501 109 597 730 6,345 996 19,731
Non Eligible Adult Sisters
Proportion Working 0.52 0.72 0.77 0.72 0.71 0.76 0.66 0.77
(0.51) (0.45) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) (0.47) (0.42)
Education 11.2 12.8 12.6 13.1 12.2 13.3 12.2 13.9
(3.45) (1.90) (2.38) (1.76) (1.95) (2.12) (2.18) (5.40)
Age 34.6 32.8 29.6 29.8 36 36.1 35 34.9
(5.46) (6.34) (5.20) (5.94) (5.39) (5.44) (5.70) (5.40)
Number of Children 1.93 1.46 1.17 1.23 2.06 1.75 2.1 1.64
(1.27) (1.15) (0.66) (1.01) (1.50) (1.36) (1.50) (1.29)
Owns a House 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.41 0.54 0.49 0.65
(0.40) (0.36) (0.17) (0.26) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48)
No. of Observations 27 501 35 597 859 6,345 1,446 19,731
GM Single GM MarriedGM Single GM Married
Table 5: Summary Statistics for HRS - Young Women Sample
Families Living Together Families Living Separately
Variable
T C T C T C T C
Elderly Women Retired 0.68 0.52 0.57 0.45 0.62 0.5 0.59 0.57
(0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Elderly Women Work 0.31 0.48 0.39 0.5 0.37 0.55 0.4 0.46
(0.46) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Weekly Hours Work (if>0) 33 35 41 37.7 37 36.7 34.8 33.9
(14.0) (13.80) (15.33) (12.96) (11.22) (13.00) (13.50) (14.50)
Provided Time Transfers - - - - 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.46
- - - - (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Provided Money - - - - 0.2 0.3 0.26 0.37
- - - - (0.40) (0.46) (0.44) (0.48)
Time Transfers (if >0) 24.2 13.6 14.4 14.6 8.6 7.9 11.5 8
(34.6) (17.4) (15.4) (20.3) (12.4) (12.7) (15.8) (13.1)
Money Transfers (if>0) 31.2 78.1 50 68.3 72 65.4 47.8 86.9
(45.7) (216) (53.8) (111) (251) (125) (52) (212)
Other Income (per week) 131 161 471 827 169 259 589 1,142
(113) (231) (335) (1290) (676) (521) (489) (1417)
Wealth ($'000) 31.4 83.9 58.7 229 27.1 159 123 443
(63.8) (167) (66.8) (534) (61) (303) (209) (941)
Education 8.2 11.3 9.16 10.4 9.52 12 10 12.3
(3.74) (3.20) (3.92) (3.86) (2.94) (2.57) (3.33) (2.41)
Black 0.44 0.52 0.31 26.2 0.31 0.24 0.2 0.08
(0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.44) (0.46) (0.43) (0.40) (0.27)
Years of Work Experience 22.6 25.2 16.4 23.7 25.8 28 23.9 24.7
(15.1) (13.9) (15.1) (12.7) (14.7) (13.4) (15.0) (13.8)
Number of Children 5.7 4.5 5.06 4.2 4.86 3.6 5.9 3.8
(2.19) (2.51) (3.04) (2.02) (2.14) (1.73) (3.06) (1.90)
Health 0.44 0.64 0.51 0.69 0.5 0.73 0.61 0.83
(0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50) (0.44) (0.49) (0.38)
Age 60 60 59 57.8 61.2 61.3 59.9 60
(4.44) (4.39) (4.82) (4.69) (4.43) (4.48) (4.63) (4.69)
No. of Observations 88 380 51 466 332 2,701 599 8,549
GM Single GM MarriedGM Single GM Married
Table 5: Summary Statistics for HRS - Elderly Women Sample
Families Living Together Families Living Separately
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
Eligible Females
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.451 0.136 0.192 0.060 0.189 0.005 0.222 0.007 -0.162 -0.053 -0.214 -0.072 -0.428 -0.146 -0.443 -0.151
(0.354) (0.092) (0.368) (0.109) (0.371) (0.015) (0.375) (0.020) (0.387) (0.133) (0.393) (0.139) (0.427) (0.159) (0.429) (0.160)
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Sisters LFP
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -0.167 -0.052 0.329 0.080 0.403 0.000 0.458 0.000 -0.212 -0.063 -0.128 -0.037 0.524 0.097 0.565 0.101
(0.693) (0.229) (0.729) (0.149) (0.748) (0.000) (0.752) (0.000) (0.736) (0.235) (0.715) (0.216) (0.837) (0.110) (0.852) (0.104)
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x x x x x
Economic x x x x
EITC x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample. Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high 
school education, being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and
dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include second order 
polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions include average  unemployment rate 
and average wage of child care workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 6S: Single Elderly Woman Sample
Table 6: Young Women's Labour Force Participation - Intergenerational Families Living Together
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 6M: Married Elderly Woman Sample
-328
615 615 615 615
-303 -272 -270
706 706 706 706
-375 -358 -331 -329
-281 -255 -223 -222
528 528 528 528
-325 -312 -282 -279
632 632 632 632
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
GM Retirement
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -0.669 -0.261 -0.600 -0.178 -2.063 -0.676 -2.054 -0.688 0.688 0.269 0.932 0.331 1.276 0.358 0.483 0.176
(0.575) (0.212) (0.628) (1.383) (1.334) (14.564) (1.499) (7.272) (0.708) (0.264) (0.762) (0.209) (1.016) (0.158) (1.098) (0.358)
**
Log Likelihood
GM Work
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.520 0.204 0.364 0.133 3.805 0.911 2.180 0.724 -0.772 -0.282 -1.387 -0.360 -0.045 -0.010 0.355 0.096
(0.649) (0.254) (0.774) (1.711) (2.001) (23.121) (2.154) (2.391) (0.702) (0.215) (0.790) (0.103) (1.260) (1.060) (1.426) (14.761)
* * ***
Log Likelihood
GM Hours Work
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 11.970* 5.442 8.024 2.981 12.545 4.230 14.410 5.027 -11.258 -4.369 -14.727 -4.754 -3.802 -1.134 6.731 2.282
(6.498) (3.211) (7.248) (3.253) (11.611) (6.447) (12.509) (6.444) (9.251) (3.265) (10.182) (2.775) (11.198) (4.285) (11.996) (6.822)
* *
Log Likelihood
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x x x x x
Economic x x x x
EITC x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
No. of Obs.
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample. Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high 
school education, being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and
dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include second order 
polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions include average  unemployment rate 
and average wage of child care workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
517 517 517 517468 468 468 468
-1367 -1285 -1240 -1232-1119 -1035 -982 -980
-256 -193 -155 -151-208 -130 -81 -79
(4)
-219 -162 -124 -121 -273 -212 -179 -176
Table 7: Elderly Women's Labour Supply - Intergenerational Families Living Together
Table 7S: Single Elderly Woman Table 7M: Married Elderly Woman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
GM Hours Care
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -10.446 -2.972 -9.783 -2.688 -28.763 -6.385 -25.010 -5.667 -0.666 -0.253 -1.366 -0.507 -1.509 -0.553 3.167 1.246
(7.259) (1.868) (7.453) (1.863) (10.320) (1.681) (10.873) (1.865) (8.195) (3.083) (7.876) (2.873) (8.617) (3.095) (9.459) (3.888)
*** *** ** ***
Log Likelihood
Net Financial Transfers
(Treatgroup)*(Reform)
R2
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x x x x x
Economic x x x x
EITC x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
No. of Obs.
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample. Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high 
school education, being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and
dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include second order 
polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions include average  unemployment rate 
and average wage of child care workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
517 517 517 517468 468 468 468
0.06 0.11 0.15 0.150.01 0.03 0.05 0.08
(10.433) (16.518) (16.477) (17.215)(33.625) (32.086) (25.000) (28.679)
13.27 16.216 15.973 10.891-24.397 -19.879 -1.111 11.871
(4)
-1557 -1135 -1097 -1089 -1584 -1552 -1524 -1519
Table 8: Intergenerational Transfers from Elderly Women - Intergenerational Families Living Together
Table 8S: Single Elderly Woman Table 8M: Married Elderly Woman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
Eligible Females
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.219 0.055 0.133 0.034 0.123 0.031 0.117 0.030 0.285 0.065 0.261 0.059 0.257 0.059 0.258 0.059
(0.120) (0.027) (0.121) (0.029) (0.121) (0.029) (0.122) (0.030) (0.099) (0.019) (0.100) (0.020) (0.100) (0.020) (0.100) (0.020)
* ** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** ***
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Sisters LFP
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.305 0.069 0.340 0.074 0.341 0.073 0.342 0.074 0.137 0.033 0.152 0.036 0.158 0.037 0.153 0.036
(0.119) (0.023) (0.121) (0.022) (0.121) (0.022) (0.122) (0.022) (0.087) (0.020) (0.087) (0.019) (0.088) (0.019) (0.088) (0.019)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * * * * * * *
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x x x x x
Economic x x x x
EITC x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample. Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high 
school education, being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and
dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include second order 
polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions include average  unemployment rate 
and average wage of child care workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
21,177 21,177 21,177 21,1777,204 7,204 7,204 7,204
-10,399 -10,050 -10,009 -9,996-3,532 -3,399 -3,369 -3,364
20,727 20,727 20,727 20,7277,073 7,073 7,073 7,073
(4)
-3,528 -3,412 -3,393 -3,387 -10,208 -9,867 -9,832 -9,820
Table 9: Young Women's Labour Force Participation - Intergenerational Families Living Separately
Table 9S: Single Elderly Woman Sample Table 9M: Married Elderly Woman Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
GM Retirement
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) 0.138 0.053 0.218 0.084 0.428 0.159 0.377 0.142 -0.110 -0.042 -0.066 -0.025 0.012 0.004 0.149 0.053
(0.268) (0.102) (0.276) (0.103) (0.327) (0.112) (0.347) (0.122) (0.163) (0.063) (0.165) (0.062) (0.189) (0.069) (0.201) (0.069)
Log Likelihood
GM Work
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -0.042 -0.017 -0.062 -0.025 -0.022 -0.009 0.016 0.007 0.118 0.046 0.092 0.035 -0.039 -0.014 -0.228 -0.080
(0.247) (0.099) (0.254) (0.101) (0.297) (0.118) (0.314) (0.125) (0.173) (0.068) (0.178) (0.068) (0.203) (0.074) (0.220) (0.073)
Log Likelihood
GM Hours Work
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -2.046 -0.888 -1.645 -0.716 -2.381 -1.033 -2.479 -1.074 3.039 1.279 3.323 1.295 1.778 0.682 -1.287 -0.479
(2.962) (1.267) (2.966) (1.268) (3.457) (1.463) (3.741) (1.579) (2.226) (0.958) (2.232) (0.899) (2.555) (0.997) (2.730) (1.003)
Log Likelihood
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x x x x x
Economic x x x x
EITC x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
No. of Obs.
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample. Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high 
school education, being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and
dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include second order 
polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions include average  unemployment rate 
and average wage of child care workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
9,148 9,148 9,148 9,1483,033 3,033 3,033 3,033
-22,021 -21,387 -21,369 -21,363-8,337 -8,023 -7,493 -7,990
-4,339 -3,823 -3,805 -3,800-1,424 -1,179 -1,155 -1,153
(4)
-1,405 -1,142 -1,121 -1,118 -4,571 -4,114 -4,094 -4,089
Table 10: Elderly Women's Labour Supply - Intergenerational Families Living Separately
Table 10S: Single Elderly Woman Table 10M: Married Elderly Woman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
GM Hours Care
(Treatgroup)*(Reform) -1.066 -0.280 -0.797 -0.208 -1.653 -0.422 -2.043 -0.518 -0.570 -0.170 -0.458 -0.136 -1.790 -0.517 -1.477 -0.428
(2.327) (0.600) (2.337) (0.603) (2.775) (0.688) (3.020) (0.740) (1.542) (0.456) (1.549) (0.457) (1.791) (0.500) (1.902) (0.537)
Log Likelihood
Net Financial Transfers
(Treatgroup)*(Reform)
R2
Controls
Own Generation x x x x x x x x x x x x
All Generations x x x x x x x x
Economic x x x x
EITC x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Census Dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
No. of Obs.
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. Estimation based on GM sample. Eligiblity based  on  Young adult women, having a child under 18, having less than high 
school education, being single or married with spouse unemployed. Controls for Young Adult Generation include  second order polynomials in  Age, Education, and Number of Children under 18 and
dummy variable for home ownership  (interacted with dummy variables for whether eligible female, non eligible female and non eligible male). Controls for Elderly Generation include second order 
polynomials in  Age, Unearned income, Wealth, Education,  Work Experience, Number of Children,  Dummies or Health, Ethnicity. Controls for Economic Conditions include average  unemployment rate 
and average wage of child care workers in census division of residence for each generation. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
** ** ** **
9,148 9,148 9,148 9,1483,033 3,033 3,033 3,033
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.010.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
(4.380) (4.457) (5.129) (5.142)(15.822) (15.944) (11.612) (12.761)
-0.226 0.166 2.799 -2.45632.293 34.108 26.877 28.843
(4)
-5,265 -5,228 -5,180 -5,179 -18,958 -18,901 -18,834 -18,830
Table 11: Intergenerational Transfers from Elderly Women - Intergenerational Families Living Separately
Table 11S: Single Elderly Woman Table 11M: Married Elderly Woman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)
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Table A
Approval  and Implementation Dates of Major AFDC Waivers And TANF, 1992 – 1998
Earliest major waiver TANF Implemented
State Approved Implemented Official Actual   
Alabama 11-15-96 
Alaska 7-1-97 
Arizona 5-22-95 11-1-95  10-1-96 
Arkansas 4-5-94 7-1-94  7-1-97 
California 10-29-92 12-1-92  11-26-96 1-1-98   
Colorado 7-1-97 
Connecticut 8-29-94 1-1-96  10-1-96 
Delaware 5-8-95 10-1-95  3-10-97 
Dist. of Columbia 3-1-97 
Florida 6-26-96 — 1  10-1-96 
Georgia 11-1-93 1-1-94  1-1-97 
Hawaii 6-24-94 2-1-97  7-1-97 
Idaho 8-19-96    7-1-97 
Illinois 11-23-93 11-23-93  7-1-97 
Indiana 12-15-94 5-1-95  10-1-96 
Iowa 8-13-93 10-1-93  1-1-97 
Kansas 8-19-96 10-1-96 
Kentucky 10-18-96 
Louisiana 2-5-96 1-1-97 
Maine 6-10-96    11-1-96 
Maryland 8-14-95 3-1-96  12-9-96 
Massachusetts 8-4-95 11-1-95  9-30-96 
Michigan 8-25-92 10-1-92  9-30-96 
Minnesota — 2  7-1-97 
Mississippi 9-1-95 10-1-95  10-1-96 7-1-97  
Missouri 4-18-95 6-1-95  12-1-96 
Montana 4-18-95 2-1-96  2-1-97 
Nebraska 2-27-95 10-1-95  12-1-96 
Nevada 12-3-96 
New Hampshire 6-18-96    10-1-96 
New Jersey 7-20-92 10-1-92  2-1-97 7-1-97   
New Mexico 7-1-97 
New York 12-2-96 11-1-97   
North Carolina 2-5-96 7-1-96  1-1-97 
North Dakota — 3  7-1-97 
Ohio 3-13-96 7-1-96  10-1-96 
Oklahoma 10-1-96 
Oregon 7-15-92 2-1-93  10-1-96 
Pennsylvania 3-3-97 
Rhode Island 5-1-97 
South Carolina 5-3-96    10-12-96 
South Dakota 3-14-94 6-1-94  12-1-96 
Tennessee 7-25-96 9-1-96  10-1-96 
Texas 3-22-96 6-1-96  11-5-96 
Utah 10-5-92 1-1-93  10-1-96 
Vermont 4-12-93 7-1-94  9-20-96 
Virginia 7-1-95 7-1-95  2-1-97 
Washington 9-29-95 1-1-96  1-10-97 
West Virginia 7-31-95 2-1-96  1-11-97 
Wisconsin 6-24-94 1-1-96  9-30-96 9-1-97   
Wyoming 1-1-97 
Note:  Implementation dates are arbitrarily stated as of the first of the month absent specific information to the contrary.  The
“actual” dates for TANF implementation are based on communications from Urban Institute staff.
Source: Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Setting the Baseline: A Report on State
Welfare Waivers and other unpublished documents.
Mean s.d Mean s.d
Proportion Working 0.6 0.49 0.84 0.37
Weekly Hours of Work (if >0) 29.5 15.7 34.5 13.5
Other Income ($'000) 8.2 12.1 30.6 61.2
Wealth ($'000) 12 70 94.7 355
Years of Schooling 10.1 1.29 13.3 2.03
Black 0.64 0.48 0.29 0.45
Age 34.4 7.6 35.5 7.7
No. of Children below 2 0.12 0.36 0.11 0.33
No. of Children between 2-5 0.28 0.57 0.22 0.48
No. of Children between 5-13 0.73 0.46 0.62 0.87
Good Health 0.73 0.45 0.91 0.29
Married 0.17 0.37 0.69 0.46
Years of Work Experience 10.2 7.2 13.4 8.3
No. of Observations
Table B1: Summary Statistics for PSID
Treatment (T) Control (C) 
2,880 41,827
Variable
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
Labour Force Participation
(Treatgroup)*(Waiver) -0.138 -0.014 -0.153 -0.015 -0.153 -0.015
(0.096) (0.064) (0.095) (0.015) (0.095) (0.015)
(Treatgroup)*(TANF) 0.390 0.027 0.287 0.020 0.285 0.019
(0.080) (0.132) (0.081) (0.017) (0.081) (0.016)
*** *** ***
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Weekly Hours of Work
(Treatgroup)*(Waiver) 0.056 0.037 0.015 0.011 -0.019 -0.013
(0.928) (0.608) (0.904) (0.629) (0.904) (0.629)
(Treatgroup)*(TANF) 5.505 3.788 4.380 3.173 4.439 3.222
(0.762) (0.551) (0.747) (0.563) (0.747) (0.565)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Controls
Demographics x x x x
Economic x x
Maximum EITC benefit x x
State Dummies x x x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x
Individual Fixed Effect x x x x
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. 
Demographic controls include age, age squared, wealth, wealth squared, unearned income, unearned
income squared, health, dummies for whether there are children under 2, 2-5, 5-13, no. of children under 
2, 2-5, 5-13,  no. of children under 2, 2-5, 5-13 squared, education, education squared, ethnicity, work 
experience, work experience squared and dummy for whether owns a house marital status
Controls for economic conditions include average unemployment rate and average wage  of child care
workers in state of residence. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
(1) (2) (3)
44,707 44,707
-14,268
Table B2: Young Women's Labour Supply
44,707
-15,231 -14,271
4470744707
-159,607 -158,121
44,707
-158,097
(1) (2) (3)
Hours of Work
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1982) -0.009 -0.145 -0.095
(0.647) (0.650) (0.651)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1983) -0.710 -0.806 -0.774
(0.796) (0.798) (0.798)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1984) -1.673** -1.802** -1.844**
(0.823) (0.823) (0.824)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1985) -0.784 -0.354 -0.449
(0.902) (0.900) (0.901)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1986) 0.271 0.515 0.424
(0.965) (0.969) (0.970)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1987) -0.271 -0.085 -0.171
(1.032) (1.021) (1.020)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1988) 0.221 0.472 0.371
(1.045) (1.045) (1.042)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1989) 0.872 1.163 1.020
(1.046) (1.036) (1.035)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1990) 0.971 1.030 0.892
(1.107) (1.095) (1.092)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1991) 0.407 0.142 -0.019
(1.139) (1.137) (1.135)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1992) 0.151 -0.157 -0.342
(1.207) (1.208) (1.204)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1993) 1.913 1.163 0.956
(1.279) (1.264) (1.261)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1994) 2.404** 1.695 1.481
(1.226) (1.205) (1.201)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1995) 2.317* 1.739 1.528
(1.244) (1.219) (1.214)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1996) 1.427 0.641 0.403
(1.324) (1.311) (1.306)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1997) 3.724*** 2.829** 2.586*
(1.411) (1.379) (1.375)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1998) 5.489*** 4.632*** 4.413***
(1.417) (1.391) (1.388)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 1999) 5.162*** 3.870*** 3.645***
(1.437) (1.402) (1.396)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 2000) 6.803*** 5.435*** 5.228***
(1.513) (1.475) (1.473)
(Treatgroup)*(Year 2001) 5.967*** 4.130*** 4.039***
(1.486) (1.487) (1.484)
Controls
Demographics x x
Economic x
Maximum EITC benefit x
State Dummies x x x
Time Dummies x x x
Individual Fixed Effect x x x
Ordinary least squares regressions. Demographic controls include age, age squared, wealth, wealth 
squared, unearned income, unearned income squared, health, dummies for whether there are children 
under 2, 2-5, 5-13, no. of children under 2, 2-5, 5-13, no. of children under 2, 2-5, 5-13 squared. Controls for 
economic conditions include average unemployment rate and average wage of child care workers in state
of residence. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
Table B3: Young Women's Labour Supply Trend Test
Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx Coeff. Mfx
Labour Force Participation
(Treatgroup)*(Waiver) -0.157 -0.054 -0.150 -0.051 -0.156 -0.053
(0.142) (1.389) (0.140) (9.182) (0.140) (10.928)
(Treatgroup)*(TANF) 0.358 0.113 0.292 0.092 0.297 0.093
(0.126) (3.682) (0.129) (20.206) (0.129) (23.524)
*** ** **
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Weekly Hours of Work
(Treatgroup)*(Waiver) 0.270 0.120 0.717 0.330 0.733 0.338
(1.711) (0.764) (1.680) (0.777) (1.682) (0.780)
(Treatgroup)*(TANF) 5.843 2.698 4.713 2.231 4.864 2.313
(1.487) (0.715) (1.495) (0.732) (1.504) (0.740)
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Log Likelihood
No. of Obs.
Controls
Demographics x x x x
Economic x x
Maximum EITC benefit x x
State Dummies x x x x x x
Time Dummies x x x x x x
Individual Fixed Effect x x x x
Maximum likelihood estimation under Mundlak (1978) fixed effect assumption. 
Demographic controls include age, age squared, wealth, wealth squared, unearned income, unearned
income squared, health, dummies for whether there are children under 2, 2-5, 5-13, no. of children under 
2, 2-5, 5-13,  no. of children under 2, 2-5, 5-13 squared, education, education squared, ethnicity, work 
experience, work experience squared and dummy for whether owns a house marital status
Controls for economic conditions include average unemployment rate and average wage  of child care
workers in state of residence. *Significant @ 10%, **Significant @ 5% & *** Significant @ 1%
-16,800 -16,665 -16,656
-2,703
(1) (2) (3)
5,635 5,635 5,635
5,635 5,635 5,635
-2,831 -2,707
Table B4: Low Educated Young Women's Labour Supply
